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PREEMPTION AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
BY KEVIN T. VAN WART*
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974' exten-
sively amended the Commodity Exchange Act.2 Prior to these amend-
ments, the CEA applied only to transactions involving certain
agricultural commodities 3 and was administered by the Commodity
Exchange Authority, a unit within the Department of Agriculture. The
CFTC Act, however, enlarged the definition of "commodity" to in-
clude not only agricultural products but also "all other goods and arti-
cles . . . and all services, rights and interests in which contracts for
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt."' 4 The Act also cre-
ated the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as an in-
dependent federal regulatory agency to administer and enforce the
Act's provisions. 5
As amended, the CEA requires boards of trade6 to secure from the
CFTC designation as a "contract market" for each futures contract 7 in
* B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University, 1976; J.D., Boston University School of Law, 1982. Mr.
Van Wart is an Associate with the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis in Chicago, Illinois.
i. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 7 U.S.C. (1976))
[hereinafter referred to as the CFTC Act]. For an excellent general review of the 1974 legislation,
see Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Preemption as Public Policy, 29
VAND. L. REV. i (1976) [hereinafter cited as Johnson].
2. Pub. L. No. 675, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980)) [hereinafter referred to as the CEA1.
3. Prior to the 1974 amendments, section 2(a)(l) of the Commodity Exchange Act defined
"commodity" to mean "wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill
feeds, butter, eggs, onions, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and oils
(including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil and all other fats and oils), cotton-
seed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen
concentrated orange juice." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
4. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). This amendment eliminated any distinction between regulated and
nonregulated commodities and brought within the regulatory embrace of the Act such actively
traded commodities as cocoa, coffee, copper, foreign currencies, iced broilers, lumber, mercury,
palladium, platinum, plywood, propane gas, silver, sugar and silver coins. See S. REP. No. 113 1,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 94, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5891.
5. 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The sponsors of this legislation expressed their
intent that the CFTC would be "comparable in stature and responsibility to the Securities and
Exchange Commission." 120 CONG. REC. 34,996 (1974) (statement of Sen. Talmadge).
6. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) defines "board of trade" to include "any exchange or association,
whether incorporated or unincorporated, of persons who shall be engaged in the business of buy-
ing or selling commodity [sic] or receiving the same for sale on consignment."
7. The CEA does not specifically define or use the term "futures contract." However, it is
generally regarded as a contract "for the purchase and sale of commodities for delivery some time
in the future on an organized exchange and subject to all terms and conditions included in the
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
which they wish to trade.8 In recent years, the futures industry has
undergone tremendous growth as these boards, in seeking contract
market designation status, have taken advantage of the more expansive
definition of commodity now contained in the CEA. They have pro-
posed futures contracts for risk-oriented business enterprises which, al-
though not traditionally involved in futures markets, could potentially
benefit from the hedging mechanism 9 uniquely afforded by futures
contracts.
Among the more unconventional proposals submitted to the
CFTC by boards of trade applying for designation as contract markets
are those involving contracts based on financial futures.' 0 These pro-
posals include interest rate futures't and contracts based on stock indi-
ces.' 2 The latter are perhaps the most controversial of all the
applications awaiting approval by the CFTC. Critics contend that
stock index futures do not constitute " 'contracts of sale of a commodity
for future delivery'" under section 2(a)(1) of the CEA.' 3 Some have
charged that such futures are essentially "dressed up" forms of wager-
ing on the price movements of financial instruments and are designed
Rules of that Exchange." S. Rep. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 102, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5843, 5892.
8. 7 U.S.C. § 8 (1976). To obtain and preserve designation as a contract market, a board of
trade must satisfy those standards enumerated in 7 U.S.C. §§ 7, 7a (1976). 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1976)
expressly prohibits trading in futures except through members of a board of trade designated by
the CFTC as a contract market.
9. Hedging is either the sale of futures against the purchase of the cash commodity or its
equivalent or the purchase of futures against forward sales or anticipated requirements of the
physical commodity. In each instance, hedging serves as protection against either a price decline
or advance. See S. Rep. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 102, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5843, 5892. Hedging is generally credited with reducing business risks in commodi-
ties which are subject to volatile price movement. See generally H. WORKING, Hedging Reconsid-
ered, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF HOLBROOK WORKING 123 (1977).
10. At present, there are as many as thirty financial futures proposals awaiting CFTC ap-
proval. Chicago Tribune, June 10, 1981, § 3, at 3, col. 2.
I1. Interest rate futures would be used by banks to shield themselves against interest rate
fluctuations in transactions involving such balance sheet liabilities as certificates of deposit and
Eurodollars. Id Although this variation of interest rate futures is unprecedented, interest rate
futures themselves are not. Interest rate futures have been available for Treasury bonds and bills
as well as Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) securities. Id
12. Applications presently pending before the CFTC include proposals based on the Value
Line Index submitted by the Kansas City Board of Trade on June 15, 1979, and Standard and
Poor's 500 Stock Price Index submitted by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange on February 29,
1980. A Portfolio Futures Complex proposal was submitted by the Chicago Board of Trade on
February 20, 1980, and is based on ten separate indices according to industry groupings and one
overall index. Architzel & Connolly, Deliery on Futures Contracts as a Legal Requirement, 36
Bus. LAw. 935, 935 n.l (1981).
13. Letter from Walter Auch, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Chicago Board
Options Exchange, to Jane Stuckey, Secretary of the CFTC (May 1, 1981) at 6 [hereinafter cited as
Auch Letter].
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to circumvent state and federal securities laws. 14 These critics have
also argued that state "bucket-shop" laws' 5 and other anti-gambling
legislation would prohibit any transactions involving such futures re-
gardless of whether the CFTC approves stock index futures and
designates contract markets on which they can be traded.' 6
Such objections have resurrected the jurisdictional disputes which
stalked the CFTC with dogged persistence from the passage of the
CFTC Act in 1974 until the renewal of that legislation in 1978.17 As
the CFTC prepares to act on these financial futures proposals,' 8 and as
Congress readies for its quadrennial review of the CFTC, 19 the propo-
nents of state regulatory authority over commodities trading are once
again posturing for an assault on the exclusive jurisdiction which the
1974 amendments conferred on the CFTC.
Part I of this article will consider some of the arguments which
critics of financial futures have raised in opposition to CFTC approval
of stock index futures. Part I will also discuss the controversy regard-
ing the presumed delivery requirement of section 2(a)(1) of the CEA
and trace the development of, and judicial response to, the nineteenth-
century bucket-shop laws which are now being cited as obstructions to
trading in stock index futures. Part II will review, in some detail, the
legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the CEA and identify
evidence of congressional intent regarding state regulation of commod-
14. Id at 3.
15. The term "bucket shop" refers to firms that offer customers the opportunity to bet on
changes in futures market prices without actually entering into futures transactions on the contract
market. See text accompanying notes 34-72 infra.
16. Auch Letter, supra note 13, at 12-17. See also Letter of Irving Pollock, SEC Commis-
sioner, to William Bagley, Chairman of the CFTC (Aug. 21, 1978) at 7-8.
17. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-
24 (Supp. IV 1980)).
18. On June 30, 1981, the CFTC approved trading of bank certificates of deposit on the New
York Futures Exchange. See Chicago Tribune, July 1, 1981, § 3, at 3, col. 2. On July 21, 1981, the
Chicago Board of Trade received approval to open trading in bank certificates of deposit futures
contracts; trading was opened the following day. See Chicago Tribune, July 22, 1981, § 3, at 3,
col. 2. Soon thereafter, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange received similar CFTC approval and
entered into futures trading in bank certificates of deposit. Id See generally Chicago Tribune,
Sept. 16, 1981, § 3, at 3, col. 2. Action on the more controversial stock index futures proposals is
still pending.
19. The 1974 amendments contained a "sunset" provision which provided for CFTC funding
only through 1978. Commodity Exchange Act § 12(d), 7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (1976). The reauthoriza-
tion legislation extended this funding another four years. Futures Trading Act of 1978, § 20, 7
U.S.C. § 16(d) (Supp. IV 1980). For a comprehensive review of this reauthorization process, see
Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Reauthorization Process: A View from the
Trenches, 1 DET. C.L. REV. 1 (1979). See also Schneider & Santo, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission: A Review ofthe 1978 Legislation, 34 Bus. LAw. 1755 (1979); Guttman, The Futures
Trading Act of 1978 The Reaffumation of CFTC-SEC Coordinated Jurisdiction Over Secu-
ritylCommodities, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1978).
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ity futures trading. Part III will then discuss the preemption doctrine
relative to the CEA and conclude that Congress did not intend the
states to perform any independent regulatory function. Finally, Part
IV will review the legislative history of the 1978 amendments to the
CEA and assess their effect on the preemption issue and the contro-
versy over stock index futures. This section will reason that state buck-
et-shop laws and other anti-gambling legislation-in addition to being
anachronistic in an era of modem regulated exchanges-are at vari-
ance with this congressional intent to preempt state regulation of com-
modity futures trading.
I. THE CONTROVERSY
Delivery Requirement of Futures Contracts
The use of the phrase "contracts of sale of a commodity for future
delivery" in section 2(a)(1) of the CEA permits an inference that a pro-
vision for delivery of the underlying commodity is a necessary element
of a futures contract. However, even though futures contracts have tra-
ditionally provided for delivery of the underlying commodity, the CEA
has never explicitly mandated that, as a prerequisite to designation as a
contract market, a board of trade must include such a delivery provi-
sion in its proposed contract. Accordingly, scholars, consistent with the
broader concepts of "delivery" and "commodity" implicit in the 1974
amendments to the CEA, have begun to reconsider this presumed de-
livery requirement.
The authors of one recent study, after reviewing both the develop-
ment of futures trading and the legislative history of the CEA, conclude
that Congress never intended to require that futures contracts provide
for the delivery of the underlying commodity in all circumstances. 20
They cite traditional congressional reluctance to enact a provision ex-
plicitly imposing delivery as a mandatory means of settlement. 2' Em-
phasizing the distinction between regulating and mandating delivery,
these authors note that some references to delivery in the CEA simply
represent congressional attempts to refine trading practices in tradi-
tional commodities. 22 They also demonstrate that other delivery refer-
ences in the CEA resulted from a general congressional desire to
minimize the price distortions which can arise when a futures contract
20. Architzel & Connolly, Delivery on Futures Contracts as a Legal Requirement, 36 Bus.
LAw. 935 (1981).
21. Id at 948.
22. Id at 946-47.
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does not fairly reflect the general value of the underlying commodity. 23
Consequently, observing that delivery is not always necessary to ensure
that the cost of the future accurately reflects the price of the commod-
ity, these authors argue that delivery is not a legal requirement of a
futures contract.24
Other scholars have expressed similar doubts as to the validity of
delivery requirements. Professor Holbrook Working has suggested that
delivery is a problem only in the United States. 25 He observes that
exchanges began to require delivery of the commodities to enable
brokerage firms to collect fees from speculators who, having lost
money, sought to avoid payment by charging that, under state bucket-
shop laws, their commodity transactions were merely wagers on price
movement. 26 Professor Working, however, believes that such provi-
sions have outlived their usefulness and has urged their elimination.
Writing prior to the 1974 CFTC Act, he suggested, instead, permitting
exchanges to decide whether to accept settlement by either delivery or
some equivalent financial instrument.27 This would be possible if Con-
gress were to amend the CEA and declare that all futures contracts
executed on an organized exchange are enforceable commercial con-
tracts.28  This would not only ease the bucket-shop law burden of
American exchanges, which Working perceived to exist at the time he
made his recommendation, but would also bring the United States into
line with other countries which, according to Professor Working, boast
efficiently operating exchanges but do not impose any delivery require-
ment on futures contracts. Since approximately only two to three per-
cent of all futures contracts are ever settled by delivery anyway, 29 such
an amendment would not disrupt trading in these markets but would
clarify and candidly acknowledge the vital hedging role which they
perform. 30
Despite these forceful challenges to the delivery concept, oppo-
nents of stock index futures have used the presumed delivery require-
ment to assail pending stock index proposals. Under section 2(a)(1) of
the CEA, the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts,
23. Id at 947-48.
24. Id at 947-49.
25. H. WORKING, Economic Functions of Futures, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF HOLBROOK
WORKING 279 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H. WORKING].
26. Id
27. Id
28. Id at 280.
29. See note 87 infra.
30. H. WORKING, supra note 25, at 279.
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agreements and transactions involving "contracts of sale of a commod-
ity for future delivery." Traditionally, contracts for sale of a "com-
modity" for future delivery have involved tangible products, such as
wheat or corn, which could be transferred physically from seller to
buyer. Under the 1974 amendments to the CEA, however, the term
"commodity," as defined in section 2(a)(l), now includes "services,
rights, and interests." Thus, futures contracts can now be written on
intangible items as well.
Stock index futures contracts would take advantage of this en-
larged definition of commodity. They would reflect expected changes
in the market value of groups of equity securities. Proponents of these
futures envision that "delivery" would consist of the transfer of an in-
strument representing the total cash market value of a particular securi-
ties group at the time of delivery. However, the index upon which the
market value of a securities grouping is measured would not create a
direct interest in the ownership of the stock. The price of the stock
index future would simply be a statement of the anticipated market
value of each group of stocks in designated futures months. Since the
stock index contract is entered into in order to participate in value
changes, the true commodity would not be the stock itself, but the value
represented by the index.
Critics of stock index futures proposals contend that such contracts
could not satisfy the delivery requirement of section 2(a)(1) of the
CEA. They insist that if shares of stock in the security groupings are
not being bought or sold or delivered, then "the proposed contracts are
nothing more than a dressed-up form of wagering on the price move-
ments of stocks traded on the NYSE." 31 These critics also argue that
elimination of physical delivery of the underlying stock certificates
would, by protecting futures from more stringent and costly securities
regulations, coax capital from the securities industry to the futures mar-
kets.3 2 Finally, they assert that Congress never envisioned futures trad-
ing on groups of common stocks and that such contracts are a form of
gambling on stock market prices which are illegal under state bucket-
shop laws. 33
Bucket-Shop Laws
The term "bucket shop" refers to a firm that purports to conduct a
31. Auch Letter, supra note 13, at 3.
32. Id. at 3-4.
33. Id at 4, 12-17. As will become clear in Part IV of this article, Congress was fully aware
of the probability and desirability of trading in futures based on stock indices.
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legitimate exchange business but which actually accepts bets and wa-
gers on the price movement of stocks and commodities. 34 Although
bucket-shop transactions were void at common law, many states re-
sponded to the "speculative spirit which . . . prevailed pre-eminently"
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century by enacting bucket-
shop legislation. 35 These statutes treated "bucketing" as a form of
gambling and made futures contracts criminally illegal where the par-
ties to the agreement never intended delivery of the underlying com-
modity but were dealing only for its prospective rise or fall in price.
The advent of organized and regulated exchanges has long since
rendered this turn-of-the-century legislation anachronistic. Indeed, an
understanding of the nature of bucket shops and an appreciation of the
circumstances which prompted the enactment of these statutes offer
convincing evidence of the folly in comparing bucket-shop transactions
to trading in stock index futures.
John Hill, a commentator during the heyday of bucket shops, in-
sisted: "There is no room for doubt as to the character of the bucket-
shop. It is a gambling den, and nothing else."' 36 Mr. Hill expressed
concern that the bucket-shop "evil" was unfairly impugning the reputa-
tion of legitimate exchanges and brokers. He noted that the victims of
bucket shops were having
their experiences cited as horrible examples and conclusive evidence
of the harmful moral and social effects of speculation; when, in fact,
both loss and harm resulted, not from speculation, but from betting
as to what would or would not occur on the New York Stock Ex-
change or on the Chicago Board of Trade. 37
Thus, he emphasized that "bucket shops have no connection with legiti-
mate exchanges. They buy from the telegraph companies or steal by
tapping wires, the quotations of the leading exchanges, and these they
post on the blackboards as the basis of bets made in their shops. '38
One early court, in discussing the urgency for anti-bucket-shop
legislation, also elaborated on the unique character of bucket shops.
The judge lamented that:
The mischief and evil consequences resulting to the state from the
operations of the bucket shop are almost beyond computation. It
34. See, e.g., Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U.S. 531, 536 (1906). For a comprehensive
study of bucket shops, see J. HILL, GOLD BRICKS OF SPECULATION (1975 reprint of 1904 ed.)
[hereinafter cited as HILL]. See also T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 89-94
(2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as HIERONYMUS].
35. See MacDonald v. Gessler, 208 Pa. 177, 181, 57 A. 361, 362 (1904).
36. HILL, supra note 34, at 20.
37. Id at 20-21.
38. Id at 20.
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assumes an air of legality and respectability, and insidiously ensnares
many innocent victims before the public learn of their danger. Its
nefarious practices are directly responsible for innumerable bank-
ruptcies, defalcations, embezzlements, larcenies, forgeries, and sui-
cides. It ought to be outlawed by statute, as its existence is a menace
to society, and its operations immoral, contrary to public policy, and
illegal. 39
Fortunately, the critics of stock index futures have not yet charged
that trading in such instruments would similarly provoke suicide, defal-
cation and other "immoral" acts. Nor have they characterized modem
commodity exchanges as "gambling dens." Nevertheless, since these
opponents of financial futures have adopted the extreme position that
bucket-shop laws pose an obstacle to CFTC approval of stock index
futures, it is useful to review, in greater detail, the traditional applica-
tion of such statutes to futures transactions.
Most bucket-shop statutes embraced the common law standard of
illegality and prohibited futures transactions where the parties did not
actually intend to deliver or receive the contract's underlying commod-
ity.40 The United States Supreme Court elaborated on this "intent to
deliver" test:
[A] contract for the sale of goods to be delivered at a future day is
valid. . . when the parties really intend and agree that the goods are
to be delivered by the seller and the price to be paid by the buyer;
and, if under guise of such a contract, the real intent be merely to
speculate in the rise or fall of prices, and the goods are not to be
delivered, but one party is to pay to the other the difference between
the contract price and the market price of the goods at the date fixed
for executing the contract, then the whole transaction constitutes
nothing more than a wager, and is null and void. 4 1
Unfortunately, as popular as this intent test was at common law
and with state legislatures, it was ill-suited to determining the validity
of commodity futures contracts entered into on organized exchanges. 42
Since, as today, actual delivery on futures contracts occurred on less
than three percent of all such transactions, 43 the judiciary experienced
great difficulty in trying to distinguish between valid commodity trans-
actions and those which were simply wagers on the price movement of
specified commodities.
The Supreme Court confronted this dilemma in Board of Trade v.
39. Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 165 Ind. 492, 512, 76 N.E. 100, 107-08 (1905).
40. These statutes are collected and analyzed in Legislation, 45 HARV. L. REV. 912 (1932).
41. Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1884).
42. See Taylor, Trading in Commodity Futures-A New Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE L.J.
63, 67 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Taylor].
43. See note 87 infra.
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Christie Grain & Stock Co. 44 Christie involved an action brought by
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) to prevent a bucket shop from
using CBOT commodity price quotations in its bucket transactions. As
a defense, the bucket shop, relying on the clean hands doctrine,
charged that the CBOT had no standing to bring the suit. The bucket
shop argued that, under the 1887 Illinois bucket-shop statutes, the
CBOT-then the largest grain exchange in the world-was itself the
greatest of bucket shops: it was a place in which was permitted "the
pretended buying and selling of grain, etc., without any intention of
receiving and paying for the property so bought, or of delivering the
property so sold.' ' 45 To support their position, the defendants noted
that delivery is not intended in ninety-five percent of all transactions on
the CBOT.46
Justice Holmes responded by defending futures transactions which
do not result in delivery. He recognized that:
Hedging ... is a means by which collectors and exporters of grain
or other products, and manufacturers who make contracts in advance
for the sale of their goods, secure themselves against the fluctuations
of the market by counter contracts for the purchase or sale, as the
case may be, of an equal quantity of the product, or of the material
of manufacture. It is none the less a serious business contract for a
legitimate and useful purpose that it may be offset before the time of
delivery in case delivery should not be needed or desired.47
Accordingly, Justice Holmes pronounced that "set-off is in legal effect a
delivery."' 48 The result of this decision was to exempt from state buck-
et-shop laws those transactions executed on exchanges between bro-
kers. Although this "grant of immunity" did not extend to futures
contracts between brokers and customers, it was nevertheless a major
step forward in eliminating the confusion which had resulted from the
unfocused application of state bucket-shop laws.
According to one scholar, the Christie opinion was the first in-
stance of institutional recognition of organized trading in commodity
futures as an essential mechanism in the marketing of commodities and
the providing of protection against market fluctuations. 49 This scholar
concluded that this decision triggered the "modem attitude" of avoid-
ing the rigid, if not unthinking, application of legislation such as buck-
et-shop statutes and, instead, encouraged examining "the trading as a
44. 198 U.S. 236 (1905).
45. Id at 246.
46. Id at 242.
47. Id at 249.
48. Id at 250.
49. Irwin, Legal Status of Trading in Futures, 32 ILL. L. REV. 155, 166 (1937).
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whole in the effort to determine which practices are socially desirable
and which should be eliminated or controlled." 50 Another commenta-
tor reviewing the Christie decision similarly averred:
The real basis of Mr. Justice Holmes' distinction can be stated
only in terms of institutions and the policy of the government in
dealing with them. Produce exchanges, in which the "set-off" settle-
ment is used, are different from "bucket shops," in which a direct
.payment or collection of price differences is employed. A small frac-
tion of exchange contracts, while virtually none of the bucket shop
contracts, are settled by delivery of grain. What is more important,
the exchange is an important and useful business institution; and not
the least of its usefulness is in the machinery which it provides for
legitimate hedging.5'
Bucket-shop operations declined in the years following the Chris-
tie decision. According to one author, bucket-shop activity, which had
begun in the United States about 1876, began to cease about 1915.52
This elimination was made possible by decisions, such as Christie, that
enabled the legitimate exchanges to control the access of bucket shops
to price quotations. 53
Perhaps because of these notable efforts of exchanges to deal with
bucket-shop abuses, other instances of institutional recognition of the
social and economic value of organized trading in futures began to
abound. Consequently, Congress, in 1922, enacted the Grain Futures
Act, expressing the view that transactions involving the sale of grain are
affected with a public interest.54 The Act, which sought to prevent ma-
nipulation of grain prices, established a form of limited regulation of
futures trading and prohibited all transactions which did not comply
with the prescribed regulations. 5 It also made it a misdemeanor to
execute certain futures contracts in grain except through members of
exchanges which had been designated as "contract markets" by the
Secretary of Agriculture. The Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of this Act in 1923.56
Despite the demise of bucket shops and notwithstanding evidence
of continuing recognition of the economic and social importance of
50. Id
51. Patterson, Hedging and Wagering on Produce Exchanges, 40 YALE L.J. 843, 867 (1931)
(footnote omitted).
52. HERONymJS, supra note 34, at 90.
53. IM; see also J. BAER & 0. SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FuTURES TRADING
291-94 (1949).
54. Grain Futures Act, Pub. L No. 331, ci. 369, § 3, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (current version at 7
U.S.C. § 5 (1976)).
55. For a discussion of this legislation, see Taylor, supra note 42, at 94-102.
56. Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
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trading on organized exchanges, problems with surviving state bucket-
shop legislation and the "intent to deliver" test persisted. This became
particularly apparent in 1933 in Dickson v. Uhlmanm Grain Co. 57 U -
mann was an action brought by the Uhlmann Grain Company to col-
lect the balance of fees due it for brokerage services it had provided the
defendants for various futures transactions.58 Uhlmann's former cus-
tomers defended on the basis that the transactions for which payment
was sought constituted gambling under Missouri law and, hence, were
illegal; they argued that in entering the transactions they had intended
only to settle for the difference in price, not to deliver or receive the
commodities underlying the futures contracts. The Uhlmann Com-
pany disputed these charges by countering that all contracts entered
into with the defendants had been executed on federally approved and
regulated exchanges and that the Grain Futures Act had superseded all
state laws relating to futures dealings on designated contract markets.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brandeis rejected the Uhlmann con-
tentions. He believed that the controversy involved two separate agree-
ments-one between the customer and the company, and the other
between the company and the exchange brokers. Although acknowl-
edging that contracts corresponding exactly to those entered into be-
tween the Uhlmann Company and the defendants had been executed
on exchanges, he determined that the primary issue was "[wihether the
customer, in his agreement with the company, ordered that the con-
tracts be entered into in his behalf on the exchange." 59 Justice Brandeis
found that this had not been the case. He noted that the customers had
received assurances from the company that they would never have to
receive or deliver any grain as a result of their speculations and that, in
fact, no grain ever was delivered by or to these customers. Thus, Jus-
tice Brandeis concluded that the only purpose of the agreement was to
exact a profit solely from fluctuations in the market price of grain.
Justice Brandeis avoided the Chrittie decision upholding CBOT
transactions between brokers by finding that the only relevant agree-
ment was that between the company and the defendants. Since these
transactions had all occurred in Missouri, he ruled that Missouri law
governed. As to the issue of preemption, Justice Brandeis determined
that the Grain Futures Act "did not supersede any applicable provi-
sions of the Missouri law making gambling in grain futures illegal."' 6
57. 288 U.S. 188 (1933).
58. The .hmann case is extensively treated in the classic article by Taylor, .wpra note 42.
59. 288 U.S. at 194.
60. Id at 198.
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According to Justice Brandeis:
The federal act declares that contracts for the future delivery of
grain shall be unlawful unless the prescribed conditions are complied
with. It does not provide that if these conditions have been complied
with the contracts, or the transactions out of which they arose, shall
be valid. It does not purport to validate any dealings. Nor is there
any basis for the contention that Congress occupied the field in re-
spect to contracts for future delivery; and that necessarily all state
legislation in any way dealing with that subject is superseded. The
purpose of the Grain Futures Act was to control the evils of manipu-
lation of prices in grain. Such manipulation, Congress found, was
effected through dealings in grain futures. Many persons had advo-
cated, as a remedy, that all future trading be abolished. Congress
took a less extreme position. It set up a system of regulation and
prohibited all future trading which did not comply with the regula-
tions prescribed. But it evinced no intention to authorize all future
trading if its regulations were complied with. Both the language of
the act and its purpose are clear; and they indicate the contrary. The
Missouri law is in no way inconsistent with the provision of the fed-
eral act. It does not purport to legalize transactions which the federal
act has made illegal. It does not prescribe regulations for exchanges.
Obviously, manipulation of prices will not be made easier, or the
prevention of such manipulation be made more difficult, because the
State has declared that certain dealings in futures are illegal and has
forbidden the maintenance within its borders of places where they
are carried on. Since there is nothing in the state law which is incon-
sistent with, or could conceivably interfere with the operation or en-
forcement of, the federal law, the statute of Missouri was not
superseded. 61
The portion of Justice Brandeis' decision relating to the applica-
tion of the "intent to deliver" test under the Missouri anti-bucket-shop
statute aroused much concern. He had premised his conclusion that
there had been a "lack of intent to deliver" on evidence that Uhlmann
officials had simply explained to the defendants the operation of the
set-off mechanism characteristic of virtually all futures transactions.62
Further, he had purposefully avoided finding that the plaintiff had ac-
ted as agent of the defendants in executing their transactions on the
CBOT. Professor Taylor, in a now classic article, expressed his fear
that, under this strained Brandeisian analysis, state bucket-shop stat-
utes, if enforced, would "render speculation impossible, hedging illegal,
and subject all brokers to criminal liability. '63 Professor Taylor also
believed that the decision of Justice Brandeis on the supersedure issue
was, although analytically sound, wholly at variance with the Grain
61. Id at 198-200 (citations and footnotes omitted).
62. Taylor, supra note 42, at 84.
63. Id at 101.
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Futures Act. Referring to the upholding of the Missouri bucket-shop
legislation, he noted: "It is difficult to conceive of a statute which
would more completely thwart the purposes of the Act than would the
Missouri statute if enforced in all cases. It is to be hoped that the final
word on this question remains to be spoken."64
STATES ACCEDE TO FEDERAL REGULATION
Shortly after the Uhlmann decision, Congress again asserted a fed-
eral interest in the regulation of commodities trading. It enacted, in
1936, the Commodity Exchange Act,65 which established a regulatory
system described as "strong exchange self-regulation with weak federal
oversight."' 66 Nevertheless, the CEA was more comprehensive than its
predecessor, the Grain Futures Act. It subjected "to regulation not
only the operation of commodity futures exchanges, as did the Grain
Futures Act, but the commodity futures transactions and dealings of
brokers and of customers, and certain activities which, while not di-
rectly involving futures trading, may affect such trading on the futures
exchanges." '67
In addition, the CEA contained its own anti-bucketing provision
which was to be enforced by each exchange.68 Failure to do so would
result in the federal government withholding designation of the ex-
change as a contract market. Significantly, the CEA also carved out a
congressional position on the issue of speculation in futures transac-
tions. The CEA provided that: "Excessive speculation in any com-
modity under contracts of sale . . . for future delivery . . . causing
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the
price of such commodity, is an undue and unnecessary burden on inter-
state commerce in such commodity. ' 69 Thus, Congress tacitly ac-
knowledged that speculation-in and of itself-is an inevitable, if not
necessary, aspect of futures transactions. It recognized that speculators
generally participate in futures markets only to profit on price move-
ment and rarely intend to receive or deliver the goods underlying those
64. Id at 102.
65. Pub. L. No. 675, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980)).
66. Rainbolt, Regulating the Grain Gambler and His Successors, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 11
(1977).
67. Bachrach, The Cloverleaf Case and Suspension of State Gambling Statutes as Applied to
Commodity Futures Transactions, 7 J. MAR. L.Q. 457, 461 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Bachrach].
68. Commodity Exchange Act § 5, Pub. L. No. 675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7
U.S.C. §§ 6a, 6c (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
69. Id (emphasis added).
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contracts.70 Congressional concern was simply with the degree of spec-
ulation, not the fact of speculation. For Congress, speculation was ex-
cessive only when it caused sudden or unreasonable fluctuations in the
price of a commodity. This legislative embrace of causation as deter-
ninative of the legality of speculation represented a significant refuta-
tion of the "intent to deliver" test which had proved so popular among
the states and which had seemingly been sanctioned by the Court in
Uhlmann.
This policy position advanced by Congress, and the prospects for
more effective regulation promised by the CEA, accelerated the demise
of the bucket-shop controversy. States, with judicial assistance, in-
creasingly began to moderate the zealous application of their bucket-
shop statutes.7' Gradual state retreat from the use of bucket-shop legis-
lation and, indeed, from the entire field of commodities futures regula-
tion, coincided with the development of organized and regulated
exchanges. This process did not abate even after the Supreme Court
affirmed that the states were entitled to regulate commodities trading
concurrently with the federal government.7 2
STATE REGULATORY ROLE AFFIRMED
Rice v. Chicago Board of Trade73 involved an attempt to invalidate
warehousing rules and regulations promulgated by the CBOT without
prior approval of the Illinois Commerce Commission. The CBOT de-
fended on the basis that the CEA had superseded Illinois law requiring
review of CBOT regulations. The United States Supreme Court re-
70. However, as Professor Taylor notes, "ITihe difference between intent to set offon the one
hand and intent to make a fictitious contract on the other is a real one, and the fact that a future
contract standing by itself requires delivery, is of importance, even though any particular parties
to a future contract intend to avoid delivery by setting off." Taylor, supra note 42, at 89. The
Ukimana Court ignored this distinction.
71. Pre-CEA cases which refused to apply bucket-shop laws to transactions entered into on
exchanges include Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188 (1933) (decision did not affect
CBOT transactions); Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 263 (1905); Lyons
Milling Co. v. Goffe & Carkener, Inc., 46 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1931); Gettys v. Newburger, 272
F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1921). In the aftermath of the CEA, some states began statutorily to validate
transactions executed on a "commodity or stock exchange." See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 28-8(a) (1979); Albers v. Lamson, 380 IML 35, 43, 42 N.E.2d 627, 630-31 (1942). The courts also
sanctioned futures agreements entered into for risk-shifting purposes and increasingly avoided the
rigid application of bucket-shop laws. See, e.g., Bomeisler v. M. Jacobson & Sons Trust, 118 F.2d
261 (1st Cir. 1941) (construing New York and Massachusetts law); Hoover Grain Co. v. Amund-
son, 70 N.D. 186, 293 N.W. 196 (1940); Boillin-Harrison Co. v. Lewis & Co., 182 Tenn. 342, 187
S.W.2d 17 (1945) (per curiam) (hedging different from gambling in that hedger has a legitimate
business interest to protect).
72. Rice v. Chicago Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947). Since Rice, no case has held that
bucket-shop statutes apply to valid, exchange-traded contracts.
73. 331 U.S. 247 (1947).
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jected this view. Section 4c of the 1936 CEA provided that "Nothing in
this section or section 4b shall be construed to impair any State law
applicable to any transaction enumerated or described in such sec-
tions."74 Referring to this provision, the Court observed that:
[Section] 4c serves the function of preventing supersedure and pre-
serving state control in... areas where state and federal law over-
lap. Where Congress used such care to preserve specific state
authority, even when it duplicated federal regulation, it is a fair in-
ference not only that supersedure was to take its natural course
where rights not saved to the States were involved.., but also that
non-conflicting state authority was left undisturbed. 75
Thus, the Court held that the CEA did not preempt state regula-
tion of commodities trading. To buttress its finding, the Court com-
pared the CEA to the United States Warehouse Act, a congressional
enactment which the Court, in a companion case, had held preempted
state authority to regulate warehouses.7 6 The Court noted that unlike
the Warehouse Act, the CEA did not contain "a declaration by Con-
gress that the system which it has adopted for the regulation of trading
on contract markets is exclusive of state regulation."' "7
The Court also found persuasive the absence of any provision
within the CEA for federal government approval of CBOT rules.7 8
Since the Act had only supplied general standards, the Court was able
to conclude that approval of such rules by the state would not conflict
with the federal regulatory scheme. The effect of this holding on state
bucket-shop laws was uncertain. The opinion expressly reserved judg-
ment on specific questions of supersedure until after states had taken
actions which demonstrably conflicted with federal measures. 79 Al-
though it seems unlikely that a court could have avoided finding a con-
flict where a state statute invalidated a transaction sanctioned by
federal legislation,80 the Court's caution nevertheless favored a liberal
construction of state regulatory authority. The opinion deftly advised
74. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L No. 675, § 4c, 49 Stat. 1491, 1494 (1936) (prior to 1974
amendment).
75. 331 U.S. at 255.
76. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
77. 331 U.S. at 253.
78. Id at 253-54.
79. Id at 254-55.
80. Prior to Rice v. Chicago Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947), one commentator had
concluded:
If a state gambling statute renders illegal a form of trading in commodity futures on
commodity futures exchanges that under the Commodity Exchange Act is lawful, such
state law would be suspended, as hampering and interfering with the operation of the
federal legislation by changing the regulatory base of the federal statute.
Bachrach, anpra note 67, at 464.
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that "even action which seems pregnant with possibilities of conflict
may, as consummated, be wholly barren of it. ' '81
It is clear that Rice both sanctioned and invited a strong state regu-
latory presence in the field of commodities trading. The states, how-
ever, declined the Rice invitation and, with the concurrence of the
courts, many began to either dismantle or disregard their archaic buck-
et-shop enactments. Each year, progressively fewer actions were
brought under state bucket-shop statutes. The paucity of such litiga-
tion suggested a general contentment with the system of federal regula-
tion under the CEA. Indeed, it was not until just prior to the
enactment of the 1974 amendments to the CEA that the states began to
exercise the hitherto unclaimed concurrent regulatory jurisdiction sanc-
tioned in Rice. However, by then they had largely abandoned their
bucket-shop statutes and, instead, were turning to their securities laws
as a means of securing regulatory jurisdiction over commodities
trading.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1974 AMENDMENTS
Impetus for CEA Reform
Throughout the summer and early autumn of 1973, the House
Subcommittee on Special Small Business Problems conducted hearings
which Congressman Neal Smith hoped would begin "the most compre-
hensive and the most inclusive study and investigation of the grain
marketing system in this country that we have ever had." 82 As dis-
cussed in these early hearings, an untimely convergence of circum-
stances accounted for this congressional interest in the commodity
futures markets. Grain shortages had caused food prices to soar. One
witness explained these higher prices as a consequence of an "ex-
traordinary coincidence of global events."' 83 Another witness raised the
81. 331 U.S. at 256.
82. Small Business Problems Involved in the Marketing of Grain and Other Commodities-
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Special Small Business Problems of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Subcommit-
tee Hearings] (statement of Rep. Neal Smith).
83. Id at 135 (statement of Frederick Uhlmann). "Global events" cited by this witness in-
cluded the systematic reduction of grain reserves in the United States, massive crop failures in the
Soviet Union which caused that country to become a major buyer of American grain, severe
droughts in India and Africa, the mysterious disappearance of anchovies--the world's second-
most important protein source for livestock feed-off the coast of Peru and severe crop damage in
the United States due to heavy rains and flooding. These circumstances reducing grain supplies
converged at the same time that worldwide demand for American grain soared as a result of a
wave of economic prosperity in Europe and Japan and two sharp devaluations of the U.S. dollar.
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spectre of foreign intervention in commodities markets. 84 Despite such
proffered justifications, consumers and farmers, buffeted by these cost
increases and groping for a more plausible explanation, accused com-
modity traders of manipulating prices. 85 They charged that there was a
direct relationship between futures trading and increases in food costs
and, as evidence, recounted how the price of soybeans had nearly tri-
pled without any change in supply.86
Coincidental with these rising food costs, trading in commodities
had surged.87 This not only taxed the enforcement resources of the De-
partment of Agriculture (DOA), 88 but also left many actively traded
commodities in a regulatory limbo. By this time, state regulation of
commodities trading was almost nonexistent. As to federal regulation,
prior to 1974 the DOA had jurisdiction only over certain farm-related
commodities specified in the CEA. 89 Consequently, as investors began
trading in futures contracts based on currencies, fuels, metals and other
commodities not embraced by the CEA, they found themselves without
any regulatory protection. Their vulnerability became spectacularly
apparent in the financial ruin which accompanied the collapse of the
"naked options" swindle perpetrated by the California firm of Gold-
stein & Samuelson.90 The Goldstein scandal smirched the entire com-
modities trading industry. It also encouraged futures officials,
concerned with the reputation of futures trading, to join in the call for
regulatory reform.
Although these hearings elicited numerous comments which sup-
ported strengthening federal regulation of the futures industry, surpris-
ingly little testimony was heard on the subject of state regulatory efforts
in the field of commodities trading. Indeed, the only reference to state
regulation was in relation to a discussion of the Goldstein scandal.
One witness noted that after the "Goldstein bubble" had burst, Califor-
nia had prohibited trading in certain options.91 For the subcommittee,
84. Id at 382 (statement of Rep. Neal Smith).
85. Id at 48-49 (statement of Harry Fortes).
86. Id The cost of July soybeans soared from $3.31 to $12.90 a bushel.
87. In fiscal year July 1, 1972, through June 30, 1973, futures trading in regulated commodi-
ties reached a record 35,642,514 transactions, compared to 25,054,684 transactions a year earlier.
Similarly, the value of these transactions increased from approximately $184 billion in 1971-72 to
nearly $400 billion in 1972-73. Note, however, that "dollar value" is a somewhat theoretical index
as it represents the value not of actual deliveries made on contracts, but the value of all deliveries
if made. Actual delivery is made on only a small percentage (2-3%) of all contracts. Id at 399-
400.
88. Id at 333 (statement of Alex Caldwell).
89. See note 3 supra.
90. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 82, at 51-52 (statement of Harry Fortes).
91. Id
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the significance of these remarks was not their exposure of renewed
state regulatory efforts, but their observation that certain commodities
were not subject to federal jurisdiction and regulation.92
Initial Hearings Before House Committee on Agriculture
In late August of 1973, the House Committee on Agriculture an-
nounced it would conduct hearings relative to its review of the Com-
modity Exchange Act.93 Although it invited written and oral
comments addressing any aspect of commodities regulation, the com-
mittee did identify certain subjects it felt were worthy of special consid-
eration. These included the creation of an independent Commodity
Exchange Commission and "[bringing all futures trading under fed-
eral regulation." 94 The committee concluded its announcement by ex-
pressing its interest "in hearing any other suggestions defining the
appropriate federal role in the regulation, if any, or protection of the
integrity of the practice of forward contracting of agricultural
commodities."9 5
The first person to testify at these hearings was Congressman Neal
Smith. He informed the Committee on Agriculture that, based on the
earlier hearings conducted by his Small Business Subcommittee, he
was recommending "that trading in all futures should be under Federal
regulation." 96 However, he did not express any opinion on the issue of
a state regulatory role. Another witness expressed concern that, with
regard to nonregulated commodities, "traders have no Federal protec-
tion against fraud or embezzlement in the handling of their futures
trades and funds." 97
Other participants in these hearings echoed Congressman Smith's
call for a stronger federal role in commodities trading and suggested
the dimensions of the problem. One witness expressed doubt that
"anyone outside the industry can grasp the magnitude of the fraud
which is daily perpetrated upon the small trader. Yet the self-dealing,
bucketing, and general cheating which goes on in unregulated com-
modities is matched by such activity in regulated commodities." 98
92. Id (exchange between Harry Fortes and Rep. Neal Smith).
93. Announcement reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 53-55 (1974).
94. Id at 54.
95. Id at 55.
96. Review of Commodity Exchange Act and Discuswon of Possible Changer Hearings Before
the House Committee on Agriculture, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1973) (statement of Rep. Neal
Smith).
97. Id at 26 (statement of Alex Caldwell).
98. Id at 79 (statement of Joel Bellows).
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Although the subject of state regulatory jurisdiction was not di-
rectly addressed at these hearings, some comments did identify the
hazards implicit in all dual regulatory schemes. As discussed in the
submissions of one witness:
[It is extremely important that federal policy regarding commodities
futures trading be uniform throughout the United States, and not be
subject to the vagaries of different interpretations by different courts
in different jurisdictions, especially in view of the technical and so-
phisticated nature of the subject being regulated and the high degree
of foreign involvement.
Similar considerations in the past have impelled Congress to es-
tablish exclusive power to enforce a regulatory statute in the hands of
a federal agency vested with the necessary expertise to formulate uni-
form national policy. 99
Filing of H. A 11955
On the basis of these hearings, on December 13, 1973, Congress-
man Poage, Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, intro-
duced H.R. 11955, a bill to "amend the Commodity Exchange Act, to
strengthen the regulation of futures trading, to bring all agricultural
and other commodities traded on exchanges under regulation, and for
other purposes."'' l In his remarks to the House, Congressman Poage
hinted at the need to reevaluate the regulatory structure of commodi-
ties trading. He observed that: "[There are great problems in the en-
tire structure of Federal authority over futures trading which demands
the attention of the Congress, inasmuch as they are problems that are a
function of the system of self-regulation by the exchanges under a lim-
ited Federal 'umbrella' of authority."' 0 Chairman Poage then placed
the states on notice that the stronger role the federal government was
about to assert in the regulation of commodities trading might displace
any previously concurrent state authority. He urged:
[Tihe time is now upon us for a significant change in the parameters
of Federal authority over the exchanges. Already, many State laws
are exercising jurisdiction over these same markets to fill what had
become a vacuum of regulation. Varied and often conflicting regula-
tion such as this could become a burden on commerce, 0fit is not al-
ready. With States seeking additional authority, litigants challenging
self-regulatory judgments, a weak system of Federal regulation, sev-
eral recent examples of abuse within the present futures structure and
the exchanges ... it is incumbent on Congress to act, and act expe-
ditiously through meaningful, thoughtful change that is well rea-
99. Id at 121 (statement of Reed Clark).
100. 119 CONG. REc. 41,340 (1973).
101. Id at 41,332.
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soned and sure. 102
As presented to Congress on that date, H.R. 11955 proposed to
enlarge the definition of commodity contained in the CEA. 0 3 The
only provision, however, directly related to jurisdictional issues was
one which preserved the jurisdiction of the Securities Exchange Com-
mission (SEC). °4 Although the language of this provisioli was am-
biguous, Congressman Poage was explicit and direct in expressing his
committee's intent. He announced that under Title II of the bill, "Al
commodities trading in futures will be brought within federal regula-
tion under the aegis of the new Commission, however, provision is
made for preservation of Securities Exchange Commission jurisdiction
in those areas traditionally regulated by it." 105
Hearings on H.R. 11955
After introducing H.R. 11955, the Committee on Agriculture
scheduled hearings to receive comments on the specific proposed
amendments to the CEA. Surprisingly, despite the ostensible interest
of the states in the regulation of commodities trading, only one state
official testified at these hearings. Although he did not express any
view on the bill's potential preemption of state regulation, this official
did note that both the SEC and state securities commissioners lacked
the power to deal effectively with fraud involving commodities
options. 106
Although conflicting SEC-CFTC authority was the jurisdictional
issue receiving the most attention at these hearings, various witnesses
did inform the committee of the continuing efforts of the states to regu-
late commodities trading under securities laws. For example, Iowa Se-
curities Superintendent Clark urged the committee to distinguish
between commodity funds which are "truly" securities, and commodity
options which many of the state legislatures were treating as securities
102. Id at 41,333 (emphasis added).
103. H.R. 11955 added to the listing of specific agricultural items the phrase: "and all [other]
goods and articles and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are
presently or in the future dealt in." Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974: Hearings
Before the House Committee on Agriculture, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 348 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
1974 House Hearings].
104. Section 201 of H.R. 11955 read in part: "Provided, That nothing contained in this Act
shall preclude the Securities and Exchange Commission from carrying out its duties and responsi-
bilities in accordance with the laws of the United States under which it was established and cur-
rently functions." Id.
105. 119 CONG. REC. 11,354 (1974) (emphasis added).
106. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 103, at 185 (statement of Glen Willet Clark, Iowa Su-
perintendent of Securities).
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to obtain regulatory jurisdiction. 0 7
Another witness testified against enlarging the regulatory role of
the federal government and suggested that the states could adequately
police commodities trading. 0 8 During questioning by the committee,
this same witness, perhaps unintentionally, illustrated the need for fed-
eral, rather than state, regulation of the commodities field. He noted
that Oklahoma was the first state to enact legislation regulating com-
modities options' 0 9 As a consequence, option underwriters and their
marketing organizations simply moved their operations to the neigh-
boring state of Texas where there was no similar legislation. There
they were able to continue, unfettered, their fraudulent option deal-
ings."10 An obvious inference from this description was that isolated
instances of state regulatory efforts were ineffective in dealing with
commodity trading abuses of a more national scope. An appropriate
response to the jurisdiction shopping by commodity swindlers would,
therefore, be the application of a uniform federal policy. This would
thwart the tendency of fraudulent trading operations to migrate to
those areas where local regulation was relatively innocuous.
In addition to this oral testimony indirectly discussing conflicting
state and federal regulatory authority, the committee received written
comments which were more pointed in their treatment of this jurisdic-
tional question. One such letter, received from the Continental Grain
Company, warned:
Failure to clarify in Sec. 201 . . . the exclusive and preemptive
jurisdiction of the CFTC over regulation of all aspects of commodi-
ties and commodity trading will result in major conflicts ofpolicy and
regulation between the CFTC and the S.E.C. and between Federal
and State regulatory bodies.
A proliferation of conflicting state regulations could quickly ad-
versely affect or even destroy the commodity futures markets ability
to function. " '
House Approval
After "mark-up" by the House Committee on Agriculture, H.R.
11955 was reprinted as H.R. 13113,112 and the committee's report was
released on April 4, 1974.' t3 Recognition of the need for exclusive fed-
107. Id at 207.
108. Id at 282 (statement of Prof. William Morgan).
109. Id
110. Id at 299.
111. Id at 322 (emphasis in original).
112. 120 CONG. REC. 9889 (1974).
113. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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eral jurisdiction pervaded this report. In chronicling the development
of commodities regulation, the Committee on Agriculture character-
ized the futures regulatory framework as consisting of "weak federal
oversight of some (but not all) commodity futures trading, coupled with
self regulation by the exchanges, and varying state laws."'" 4 It con-
cluded that this regulatory approach to commodities trading-although
adequate in earlier times-required revision in favor of a stronger fed-
eral role." 5 The report insisted that "[ilt is abundantly clear that all
futures trading must be brought under a single regulatory umbrella."" 16
Although, in context, this statement simply encouraged the elimi-
nation of a distinction between regulated and nonregulated commodi-
ties, the report also suggested that the enlargement of the federal role
might be of a magnitude which would displace any parallel regulation
by the states. In its report, the Committee on Agriculture noted that
during the fifty-two year history of the CEA:
[The] legislative mandate of maintaining a status of limited federal
regulation and self-regulation with the exchanges has remained un-
changed. While the Committee bill does not envision an end to self-
regulatory activities by the exchanges, it does replace the present lim-
ited federal authority with a more comprehensive grant of federal au-
thority to make the overall regulatory pattern of the industry more
appropriate to the times and the needs of the American public and
the international economy." 17
The report also referred to evidence of extensive trading abuses,
including bucketing, which, despite state regulatory authority and some
relevant state laws, persisted as a consequence of limited federal au-
thority." The committee buttressed its position in support of a domi-
nant federal role by citing the problem it perceived of "[a] growing list
of proposed and actual state regulations and laws, moving into areas
(such as commodity options in non-regulated commodities) where the
Federal law, to date, has not entered.""19
It is apparent that the committee intended that the proposed
amendments to the CEA would serve as a check on renewed state regu-
latory efforts. It was the committee's express objective that the legisla-
tion would "put all exchanges and all persons in the industry under the
same set of rules and regulations for the protection of all concerned."' 20
114. Id at 36.
115. Id
116. Id at 41-42.
117. Id at 42 (emphasis added).
118. Id at 46-47.
119. Id at 48.
120. Id at 76.
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Clearly, such regulatory uniformity could not be achieved if each state
were permitted to impose its own requirements on commodities trad-
ing. Even the dissenting members of the Committee on Agriculture
impliedly acknowledged that these proposed amendments would elimi-
nate any dual scheme of regulation. In its report, the minority charged
that the federal legislation was so pervasive that it "gives sweeping gov-
ernment control over nearly every aspect of futures trading."' 2' On
April 11, 1974, the House approved H.R. 13113 and submitted it to the
Senate for action.
Senate Hearings
In May of 1974, the Senate Committee on Agriculture and For-
estry began conducting its own hearings on four bills-including H.R.
13113-which would regulate commodity futures trading. Throughout
these hearings, various witnesses apprised the Senate committee of the
attempts by the states to regulate commodity transactions. Indeed, dis-
cussion of a state regulatory role was much more direct and extensive
than that in the earlier House hearings.
PRO-PREEMPTION TESTIMONY
Among the first statements received by the committee was that of
Tom Maher, the Director of the South Dakota Division of Securities
and Consumer Protection. 22 Although Mr. Maher reviewed various
difficulties he had encountered in dealing with commodity option
problems, he did not suggest that the remedy lay in more vigorous state
enforcement measures. To the contrary, he indicated that regulation of
commodity options exceeded state capabilities. He recounted how
trading in "unregulated commodities" had forced his agency to attempt
to secure jurisdiction by enlarging and expanding its securities laws,
which, he averred, were obviously not intended to deal with such trans-
actions. Consequently, he urged Congress to invigorate the CEA's en-
forcement capability, to bring all unregulated commodities under the
new agency's jurisdiction and to implement strong and comprehensive
regulations in the commodity exchange area.
In other testimony, a witness informed the committee of legislation
pending in Nebraska which would have established a Nebraska Fu-
121. Id at 165.
122. Commodity Futures Trading Commirmon Act Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Agricuitrwe d Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 224-25 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Senate Hear-
ings] (statement of Tom Maher).
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tures Trading Commission and would have required the Minneapolis
Exchange to establish a delivery point in Nebraska.1 23 The bill pur-
portedly provided that, if such a delivery point were not established,
Nebraskan citizens would be prohibited from any futures trading on
the Minneapolis Exchange. This disclosure prompted one senator to
comment that such legislation would be a "real problem" if introduced
throughout the states. 24 This senator then asked the witness whether
he would "agree that this . . .Federal legislation really ought to pre-
empt State legislation so that we do not have the 50 different States
legislating in this area?"' 25 Not surprisingly, the witness agreed, and
added: "After the Nebraska bill came out we had other State depart-
ments of agriculture, Minnesota, for example, asking if we thought
other States should have State legislation. And it seemed to me that
State legislation would make an impossible situation for exchanges." 26
Other witnesses suggested that, unlike the Nebraska legislation,
other state regulatory efforts were not motivated by self-interest, but
simply by the absence of federal regulation. As one participant in these
hearings testified relative to world commodities: 27
Due to the lack of specific Federal regulation, many States have been
enacting special laws to prevent the abuses of recent years of which
we are all aware. If there is a firm and clear Federal law on this
subject, I think it would prove of great help to the individual States
in preventing the misuse [of] options.' 28
The first direct analysis of the preemption question was contrib-
uted by a representative of the commodities industry. Wary of the dif-
123. Id at 391 (statement of Alvin Donahoo).
124. Id at 396 (statement of Sen. Dick Clark).
125. Id After mark-up of the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of H.R. 11955, section 201 was
rewritten with two subsections. As reprinted in H.R. 13113, section 201(B) read, in relevant part:
Provided, That the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of transactions dealing
in, resulting in, or relating to contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded
or executed on a domestic board of trade or contract market or on any other board of
trade, exchange, or market: Andprovidedfurther, That nothing herein contained shall
supsersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities Exchange
Commission [sic] or other regulatory authorities under the laws of the United States or
restrict the Securities and Exchange Commission and such other authorities from carry-
ing out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with the laws of the United States.
H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1974) (emphasis in original). Cf. the earlier version of
section 201(B) considered in H.R. 11955, supra note 104.
126. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 396 (statement of Sen. Dick Clark).
127. Also known as international commodities, world commodities include silver, silver coins,
platinum, cocoa, plywood, copper, coffee and world sugar. Prior to the 1974 amendments, world
commodities were not subject to regulation. See Int'l Trading Ltd. v. Bell 11977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,495 at 21,994; Long, The Naked Commodity Option
Contract as a Security, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 214 (1973).
128. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 508 (statement of Paul Franklin).
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ficulties which can result when jurisdictional authority overlaps, this
witness testified:
Section 201 of the House bill, which deals with the jurisdiction
of the Commission, does not end the confusion in both Federal and
State law as to who should regulate the futures trading industry.
While the House bill seems to make it clear that any potential new
futures contract is to be regulated exclusively by the proposed Com-
mission, even this provision could stand clarification. Some State
courts have interpreted devices relating to the trading of futures as
securities. This may have come about mainly out of desperation at
the lack of any effective Federal regulations. The SEC interprets
some aspects of futures trading as within the broad definition of a
security under the Securities Act of 1933. The committee will be do-
ing a great favor to the industry and the American public if it would
change the jurisdictional provisions of section 201 to insure that if
any transaction relates to a futures contract and is regulated by the
Commission, these rules and regulations are preemptive of State reg-
ulations to the contrary and are exclusive of other Federal
regulations. 129
Glenn Willet Clark, a professor of law who, since his testimony at
the earlier House hearings, had completed his service as the superinten-
dent of securities for the State of Iowa, also addressed the issue of ex-
clusive jurisdiction. He insisted:
None of the proposed bills, in their present form, contemplate
Federal preemption of the field. Perhaps it has not been brought to
the attention of the Congress that traditional, long-existing, stable
commodity trading institutions are now being subjected to a wither-
ing crossfire of disparate State regulation which, if unchecked by res-
olute Federal regulation, may force legitimate commodities dealers
to cease activity in certain States, or, equally bad, to tailor their ac-
tivities in all States to meet the eccentric requirements of a single
State. 1 3 0
Thus, he chided the "well-meaning, but eccentric and ill-informed
State attempts to regulate commodities markets under the guise of se-
curities regulation. The States cannot now, in my judgment, begin to
do so with any but ill effects."' 13 1 Professor Clark, whose service as a
state securities commissioner had been "during the period in which the
involvement of [state] securities regulators in the fringes of the com-
modities markets grew by leaps and bounds,"' 132 crisply advised the
committee on the issue of exclusive jurisdiction. He asserted: "It is my
judgment that the new Commission's authority with respect to orga-
129. Id at 541 (statement of John Clagett).
130. Id at 681 (statement of Glenn Willet Clark).
131. Id
132. Id at 682.
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nized trading in contracts for future delivery should be plenary and
exclusive, both as against other Federal agencies and against the
States."1 33
In response to this advice, Senator Talmadge, chairman of the
committee, inquired whether Professor Clark "would preempt the
States jurisdiction entirely?"' 34 Professor Clark's reply of "very defi-
nitely"1 35 prompted additional discussion, including the view expressed
by Senator Clark that if preemption did not occur, "different State laws
would just lead to total chaos."' 36 Professor Clark, characterizing him-
self as a "veteran of the blue sky wars," reminded the committee of the
problems experienced by the securities bar in "dealing simultaneously
with the largely overlapping securities laws of 51 jurisdictions."'' 37 He
implored the senators not to create a similar "nightmare" with respect
to commodities.
Other witnesses expressed similar concern that states were using
the definition of "security" to assert jurisdiction over commodities trad-
ing. The comments in one submission detailed state efforts in this
regard:
Recognizing the growing interest in commodities on the part of the
public, and particularly in certain unregulated commodities ...
various existing regulatory agencies perceive the need for regulations
to protect the public from fraud. In response to this need, the State
of California recently passed a Commodity Law and various other
states are considering regulation of commodities either through a
commodities act or by defining commodities contracts as a security.
Michigan has this area under active review. The Wisconsin Securi-
ties Act already defines a contract for future delivery of a commodity
as a security, subjecting them to the anti-fraud and other provisions
of the Act, but exempting them from registration requirements. The
State of Arizona recently amended its Securities Act to define a com-
modity as a security, and the States of Texas and Arkansas have re-
cently, either administratively or judicially, found certain types of
contracts for future delivery of a commodity to be a security, subject
to their state securities laws. 138
This witness warned: "Without passage of an Act such as is pres-
ently proposed, the entire commodity area would be left subject to
much confusion, a commodity contract being variously designated and
133. Id at 679.
134. Id at 684.
135. Id at 685.
136. Id
137. Id
138. Id at 752 (statement of M. Martin Rom).
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regulated as a security or commodity in different jurisdictions." 139 Al-
though he believed that the proposed legislation, by subjecting all com-
modities to regulation, would solve many of the problems stemming
from "unregulated commodities," this witness also emphasized that:
Further consideration must be given to regulating the variances be-
tween federal and state provisions in this area. It is vital that federal
legislation preempt the states in making a determination that the
various commodity contracts are, in fact, classified, regulated and
traded as commodities and not as securities. State administrators
would then be free to define their own regulations within these
limitations. 140
ADJUDICATIVE PREEMPTION
In a letter to the Senate committee, Chairman Peter Rodino of the
House Judiciary Committee expressed his concern regarding preemp-
tion. Referring to section 201(B) of H.R. 13113, Chairman Rodino ad-
vised that "[t]his double proviso could be construed to raise a question
of federal preemption of the commodity futures industry and, there-
fore, unnecessarily raises a question of federal-State relationships."' 4'
The thrust of these comments, however, was not regulatory preemp-
tion, but rather adjudicative preemption. Chairman Rodino was con-
cerned that the proviso could deprive state courts of their jurisdiction
over commodity futures contracts "presently enforceable in State courts
under recognized commercial law and contract principles."'' 42 Addi-
tionally, he feared that the failure to include "federal district courts" as
an exception to the exclusive jurisdiction clause of that section would
cause the constitutionally dubious result of exempting commission de-
cisions from judicial review. 143
Section 201(B) aroused similar concern from others. One witness,
representing the Department of Justice, characterized it as
"[plotentially the most troublesome provision of H.R. 13113."' 144 Like
Chairman Rodino, this witness believed that:
If section 201(B) were read literally, State courts might be deprived
ofjurisdiction to enforce State contracts and commercial law relating
to futures contracts since jurisdiction over those contracts is placed
exclusively in the Commodity Exchange Commission. That this was
not the intended effect of the bill is evidenced by the fact that no
139. Id
140. Id
141. Id at 260.
142. Id
143. Id
144. Id at 663 (statement of Keith Clearwaters).
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substantive provisions in the nature of contract or commercial law
are included in the bill. Clearly, the Commission was not intended
to adjudicate disputes between commodities brokers and their cus-
tomers over contract terms or similar matters.145
To avoid such confusion, this witness recommended that the committee
clarify the section 201(B) exclusive jurisdiction provision. He noted
that:
Deletion of everything in section 201(B) beginning with the first pro-
viso of that section would also eliminate any problem in this regard.
Jurisdiction for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act would
then be conferred on the Commission by the affirmative language of
other provisions of the bill, while other adjudicatory authorities, in-
cluding State and Federal courts, would not be deprived of jurisdic-
tion to hear matters traditionally entrusted to them.146
The chairman of the Senate committee concurred with these views.
He similarly doubted that "the House had in mind depriving either
Federal courts [of jurisdiction] in antitrust matters, or any other matter,
and certainly not State courts."' 47 He suggested that the witness work
with the committee's staff to revise language in H.R. 13113 "to make it
clear that we don't propose to deprive Federal courts of antitrust juris-
diction, or State courts' jurisdiction." 48
MANAGED ACCOUNTS
Other discussions focused on the controversy relating to the regu-
latory status of managed accounts. Both the commodity industry and
regulatory officials concurred that an agreement between a customer
and his commodity broker for the trading of commodity futures is not a
security within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933, so long as the
broker executes trades only at the direction of his customer. Thus, they
agreed that in such situations only the Commodity Exchange Authority
would have regulatory authority with respect to the terms and condi-
tions of the agreement between the customer and his broker. In man-
aged accounts, however, a trader and a broker enter into agreements by
which the trader confers discretion on his broker or any other person to
trade his account. As one witness testified:
In this instance, the law is unclear whether the agreement and the
trading pursuant thereto constitute a "security" within the meaning
of the Securities Act of 1933. On this point there are confficting fed-
eral court decisions and varying opinions among federal and state
145. Id at 663-64.
146. Id at 663.
147. Id at 664.
148. Id
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regulatory personnel. . . . Since this Committee is attempting to
refine the system of regulation in our industry, it is appropriate now
to resolve, rather than to perpetuate, this difference of opinion con-
cerning managed accounts. 149
Urging statutory clarification that the new commission would have
exclusive regulatory jurisdiction to determine what constitutes a futures
contract, this same witness noted that the ostensible objective of the
pending legislation was an improved and comprehensive program for
commodity futures regulation. He then queried whether: "Having cre-
ated the regulatory program, and formed a commission with the exper-
tise and manpower to implement that program, should not Congress
vest in the new commission exclusive jurisdiction over all commodity
trading accounts-managed and regular?"1 50
PRO-STATE REGULATION TESTIMONY
Ironically, the strongest statement in favor of a state regulatory
role was not submitted until after the formal Senate hearings had con-
cluded. This statement addressed "the need and urgency to decentralize
the structure of the commodity futures industry."' 51 The author argued
that "this basic structural reform should provide for decentralization of
the commodity exchange system so that State supervision and control of
the system is clearly incorporated in the regulatory framework of this
burgeoning industry."1 52 Admonishing Congress not to ignore any
longer "the fact that State supervision and regulation is an absolute
necessity," he favorably cited the "trend toward State supervision and
regulation" which he perceived to be underway. 53 These comments,
however, ignored what the proposed amendments sought to accom-
plish. For example, in his statement, the author noted:
One of the basic reasons for the need for decentralized control
and State supervision of the commodities industry is the new growth
community which has emerged.. . [and which] comprises millions
of investors who have been provided with innovative investment ve-
hicles and markets ... in which returns and rewards have proved
gratifying but which currently are unregulated either at the Federal or
State level.' 54
Considering that a major feature of the proposed amendments of
the CEA was the bringing of all commodities under federal regulatory
149. Id at 715 (statement of Harold Heinold).
150. Id
151. Id at 814 (statement of Arthur Economou).
152. Id
153. Id
154. Id at 815.
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authority, the situation which prompted the above comments-unregu-
lated commodities-would no longer exist. Thus, it is doubtful that
these remarks in support of "a dual Federal/State regulatory system"
had any validity.
Mark- Up
The Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry began its ex-
ecutive mark-up of the futures trading legislation on August 7, 1974,
and completed its changes the following day. The exclusive jurisdic-
tion provisions of section 201 agreed to by the committee read:
Provided, That the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with
respect to accounts, agreements. . . and transactions involving con-
tracts of sale of a commodityforfuture delivery, traded or executed on
a contract market designated pursuant to section 5 of this Act and
which, in accordance with section 4h of this Act, may not lawfully be
executed or consummated otherwise than through a member of a con-
tract market: And providedfurther, That, except as hereinabove pro-
ide nothing contained in this section shall (i) supersede or limit the
jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission or other regulatory authorities under the laws of the United
States or of any State, or (ii) restrict the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and such other authorities from carrying out their duties and
responsibilities in accordance with such laws. s5
By inserting the phrase "except as hereinabove provided," the
committee was simply trying to "clarify" the House bill. As explained
in the report by the committee after this mark-up session:
The House bill provides for exclusive jurisdiction of the Com-
mission over all futures transactions. However, it is provided that
such exclusive jurisdiction would not supersede or limit the jurisdic-
tion of the Securities and Exchange Commission or other regulatory
authorities.
The Committee amendment retains the provision of the House
bill but adds three clarifying amendments. The clarifying amend-
ments make clear that (a) the Commission's jurisdiction over futures
contract markets or other exchanges is exclusive and includes the
regulation of commodity accounts, commodity trading agreements,
and commodity options; (b) the Commission's jurisdiction, where ap-
plicable, supersedes State as well as Federal agencies; and (c) Federal
and State courts retain their jurisdiction. 5 6
Senate Action
In presenting the committee's recommendations to the Senate on
155. S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1974) (italics in original) (emphasis added).
156. Id at 6.
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September 9, 1974, Senator Talmadge reiterated that: "In establishing
this Commission, it is the committee's intent to give it exclusive juris-
diction over those areas delineated in the act. This will assure that the
affected entities--exchanges, traders, customers, et cetera-will not be
subject to conflicting agency rulings."' 157 However, Senator Talmadge
seemed to contradict himself, and confuse others, when he added:
[I]t is not the intent of the committee to exempt persons in the futures
trading industry from existing laws or regulations such as the anti-
trust laws, nor for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to
usurp powers of other regulatory bodies such as those of the Federal
Reserve in the area of banking or the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in the field of securities.' 58
By itself, this last statement implied that regulatory jurisdiction at
the federal level would be concurrent; thus, it was inconsistent with all
previous discussions regarding preemption and exclusive jurisdiction.
The most plausible explanation for, and reconciliation of, these state-
ments has been advanced by the current CFTC Chairman who, in re-
viewing the 1974 CEA amendments shortly after their enactment,
suggested: "The better reading would be that the Chairman, like his
counterpart in the House, wished simply to assure his colleagues that
the SEC and other agencies would retain their 'traditional' roles which
had never included the regulation of futures trading on commodity
markets."1 59
An amendment subsequently offered by Senator Curtis seems con-
sistent with this interpretation. At the time of these debates, section 4c
of the CEA provided: "Nothing in this section or section 4b shall be
construed to impair any State law applicable to any transaction enu-
merated or described in such sections."' 6o Senator Curtis urged his
colleagues to delete this section "[in order to assure that Federal pre-
emption is complete."' 16 In his remarks, Senator Curtis expressed his
understanding that:
[T]he intent of the bill is to grant exclusive jurisdiction over com-
modity futures trading to the new Commission, except to the extent
the bill specifies that other Federal and State agencies and Federal
and State courts are to retain jurisdiction. However, as I understand
it, it is also the intent of the bill that, even in the cases where the State
agencies and State courts retain jurisdiction, the Federal substantive
law embodied in the Commodity Exchange Act as amended by the
157. 120 CONG. REC. 30,459 (1974).
158. Id
159. Johnson, supra note 1, at 16-17.
160. 120 CONG. REC. 30,464 (1974).
161. Id
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
bill would preempt the field completely, so that if any substantive
State law were contrary to or inconsistent with Federal law, the Fed-
eral law would govern.162
Senator Talmadge, who had chaired the hearings on this legisla-
tion and presided over the mark-up session, concurred with Senator
Curtis' assessment. He advised his colleagues: "I have studied the
amendment of the distinguished Senator from Nebraska. I agree with
its import. I urge the Senate to adopt it." 163 Consequently, section 4c
was deleted.
Conference Committee
The Senate and House versions of H.R. 13113 went to a confer-
ence committee in September, 1974. The committee adopted the Sen-
ate amendments regarding the jurisdiction of the CFTC. As explained
in the conference report:
Under the exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the Commission, the
authority in the Commodity Exchange Act (and the regulations is-
sued by the Commission) would preempt the field insofar as futures
regulation is concerned. Therefore, if any substantive State law
regulating futures trading was contrary to or inconsistent with Fed-
eral law, the Federal law would govern. In view of the broad grant
of authority to the Commission to regulate the futures trading indus-
try, the Conferees do not contemplate that there will be a needfor any
supplementary regulation by the States.164
Final Approval
The House approved H.R. 13113 on October 9, 1974, and the Sen-
ate followed suit the next day. Introductory remarks in both Houses
again emphasized the preemptive effect H.R. 13113 would have relative
to state regulatory authority over commodity trading. For example,
Congressman Poage, who presented the conference report to the
House, noted that:
[H.R. 13113] provides the first complete overhaul of the Commodity
Exchange Act since its inception, and creates a comprehensive regula-
tory structure to oversee the trading of futures. The bill is a consid-
ered approach toward solving both immediate and readily
perceivable problems besetting futures markets and the public inter-
est, and makes several major changes in the role of the Federal Govern-
ment in regulating all futures trading enterprises.165
162. Id (emphasis added).
163. Id
164. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5843, 5897 (emphasis added).
165. 120 CONG. REC. 34,736 (1974) (emphasis added).
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Acknowledging that "[o]ne of the most difficult issues to be re-
solved in the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act was the
jurisdiction of the new Commission," Congressman Poage character-
ized the jurisdiction of the commission as "extensive and complete rela-
tive to the trading of futures."' 66
It is also apparent from Congressman Poage's references to section
412 of the Act that Congress anticipated a displacement of state regula-
tory activity. Congressman Poage expressed the view of his committee
that:
This act is remedial legislation designed to correct certain abuses
which Congress found to exist in areas that will now come within the
jurisdiction of the CFTC. Congress was aware that there have been
ongoing efforts by various State and Federal regulators to prevent
some of these abuses. Accordingly, section 412 was included in the
bill to make clear that allpending proceedings, including ongoing in-
vestigations, as well as court proceedings, should continue unabated
by any provision of the act. This also is necessary in order toprevent
the creation of any regulatory gaps, particularly during the time be-
tween the adoption of this legislation and the full implementation of its
provisions by the CFTC.167
Implicit in these comments is an acknowledgment that full imple-
mentation of the CEA amendments would result in the CFTC assum-
ing functions formerly performed by the states. Congressman Poage
was advising the states that only pending proceedings and ongoing in-
vestigations could continue. New matters, however, would be subject
to exclusive, not concurrent, CFTC jurisdiction.
CFTC Act Extension
The CFTC Act was signed into law on October 24, 1974.168 Al-
though the Act was expected to become effective on April 21, 1975,
delays in the appointment of CFTC commissioners prompted Congress
to adopt a joint resolution, H.R.J. Res. 335, deferring the activation of
certain provisions in the 1974 amendments. 69 In its report on H.R.J.
Res. 335, the House Committee on Agriculture emphasized that, "No
provision in the resolution . . . alters existing law with respect to the
jurisdiction of other Federal or State regulatory efforts."' 70 Thus, the
resolution was not intended to delay the preemptive effect of the 1974
166. Id (emphasis added).
167. Id at 34,737 (emphasis added).
168. Id at 36,278 (1974).
169. H.R.J. Res. 335, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
(89 Stat.) 77.
170. H.R. REP. No. 122, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975).
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amendments. The Senate report further clarified that the resolution
would not defer the effective date of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred
on the CFTC by the 1974 amendments. The report specified that, "Ex-
cept as specifically provided therein, the resolution is not intended in
any way to make substantive changes in the 1974 Act and the Com-
modity Exchange Act, as amended."' 7 ' The report also emphasized,
however, that "the preemption of the regulation of commodity futures
trading by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974
does not prevent the States from enforcing their criminal anti-fraud
statutes." 72
III. PREEMPTION
The preemption doctrine 173 is a corollary of the supremacy clause
of the Constitution. 17 4 Under it, courts may invalidate state legislation
which infringes on areas Congress has expressly or impliedly reserved
to itself. Since "'[the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touch-
stone'" in determining whether a state statute is invalid under the
supremacy clause, 175 preemption analysis is essentially an attempt to
divine congressional intent.' 76 The courts have traditionally indicated
a willingness to infer an intent to preempt state legislation even in the
absence of clear congressional expression on the matter. 77 Such an in-
ference has been likely where the federal regulatory scheme was so per-
vasive, or the need for uniformity so apparent, that it was tantamount
to federal "occupation of the field."' 78 Alternatively, the courts have
171. S. REP. No. 73, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 5,reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
143, 147.
172. Id
173. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine.- Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
174. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
175. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Scher-
merhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
176. "The question whether federal law 'preempts' state action [is] largely one of statutory
construction .... L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 377 (1978).
177. In Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978), the Court acknowledged that,
"Often Congress does not clearly state in its legislation whether it intends to pre-empt state laws,"
but noted that it would nevertheless find preemption if the state law "conflicts with federal law or
would frustrate the federal scheme, or. . . the courts discern from the totality of circumstances
that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the States." Id at 504.
178. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941).
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found preemption if the congressional act touched a field where the
federal interest was so dominant that it necessarily precluded enforce-
ment of state laws on the same subject. 179 Finally, even if Congress has
not completely foreclosed state legislation in a particular area, the
courts have held state statutes void to the extent they actually conflict
with a valid federal statute or would frustrate "the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'180
More recently, however, decisions of the Supreme Court involving
preemption analysis have suggested a judicial disinclination to find
preemption where congressional intent is uncertain. In New York De-
partment of Social Services v. Dublino,181 the Court, quoting from an
earlier decision, warned:
If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its inten-
tion clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute was in-
tended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state unless there
is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise of federal
supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.18 2
Soon after Dublino, the Court, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Ware, 8 3 hinted at the probable objective of its seeming imposi-
tion of specific intent as a prerequisite to a finding of preemption.
There, Justice Blackmun, referring to preemption analysis, expressed
the Court's "conviction that the proper approach is to reconcile 'the
operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than hold-
ing one completely ousted.' "184
Despite this evidence of a judicial proclivity to reject pervasiveness
and potential conflict as preemptive grounds, other cases suggest that
these doctrinal bases have survived and that the Court will still infer
intent, even in the absence of clear congressional expression. 8 5 For
179. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
180. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
181. 413 U.S. 405 (1973). See also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132
(1978) ("This Court is generally reluctant to infer preemption...").
182. 413 U.S. at 413 (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)).
183. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
184. Id at 127 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
185. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (the Court found that a federal
statute regulating the weight labels on bacon and flour preempted stricter state statutes whose
enforcement would have frustrated the congressional purpose to use uniform package weights to
facilitate comparison by consumers); Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (the
Court invalidated a city noise control ordinance which prohibited jet aircraft from taking off at a
private airport during nighttime hours; the Court found that enforcement of this ordinance would
hinder centralized control of takeoff and landing times and necessarily curtail, to a substantial
degree, the flexibility of federal agencies in controlling air traffic flow under a comprehensive
scheme of federal regulation of the industry). Cf. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620-
21 n.4 (1978), where the Court refused to find preemption where it could find no "clear and
manifest purpose of Congress" to preempt the entire field of interstate waste management or
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purposes of the CEA, however, establishing such an inference may be
an unnecessary tautological exercise. Even under the stricter standard
of Dublino, it is apparent that Congress has "clearly" manifested its
intention to supersede state regulation of commodities trading.
As reviewed above, preemption was a central issue in the proceed-
ings which culminated in the 1974 amendments to the CEA. Numer-
ous witnesses testified extensively as to the efforts of the states to use
their securities laws to regulate, in varying fashion, commodities trad-
ing. Members of Congress expressed concern that confusion in futures
markets could result from these conflicting laws. They concurred with
witnesses as to the importance of securing uniform regulation of com-
modities trading and imposing comprehensive federal authority over a
field which had direct implications for the well-being of the national
economy. It was against this background of informed and thorough
deliberation as to the preemptive scope of the proposed legislation that
the 1974 amendments emerged.
In its final form, section 2(a)(1) of the CEA explicitly vested "ex-
clusive jurisdiction" in the CFTC over all transactions involving or re-
lated to commodity futures contracts. Section 4c, which had expressly
preserved state regulatory authority, was deleted "to assure that pre-
emption is complete."' 86  Section 5a(12) was inserted to require all
commodity exchanges to secure prior CFTC review and approval of all
trading rules and regulations adopted by the various boards of trade to
govern futures transactions.187 These amendments established in-
dependent evidence of congressional intent to displace any state regula-
tory role.'8 8 In addition, they wholly and unequivocally eliminated
transportation and where Congress had expressly provided in the Waste Disposal Act that states
retain a primary role in collection and disposal of waste. The Supreme Court has acknowledged
that there is no clear and consistent approach to preemption analysis. In Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941), Justice Black observed that no one formula "provides an infallible constitutional
test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear
distinctly marked formula." Id at 67. This admission has not made it any easier for lower courts
to apply the multifarious preemption pronouncements of the Court. One frustrated court con-
cluded that "this area is imbued with result-oriented decisions which tend to comport with the
philosophical leanings of the Supreme Court." Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F.
Supp. 420, 435 (N.D. Tex. 1977), rev'dsub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S.
173 (1979).
186. See text accompanying notes 160-63 supra.
187. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 5a(12), 88 Stat. 1389, 1401-02 (1974) (current version at 7 U.S.C.
§ 7a(12) (Supp. IV 1980).
188. See also Russo & Lyon, The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, 6 HOFSTPA L. REV. 57, 69 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Russo & Lyon] where the
authors, applying preemption analysis, similarly conclude that Congress intended pervasive fed-
eral regulation. Cf Note, he Pre-emption Doctrine and the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sionAct: In Favor of State Law, 11 IND. L. REV. 467 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Preemption Note]
(suggesting that the CFTC Act has not totally preempted state regulation of commodities trading).
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each of the bases the Supreme Court had relied on in Rice v. Board of
Trade to hold that the CEA did not preempt state regulation of com-
modities trading. 89
Judicial Application of Preemption Doctrine to 1974
Amendments." 1974-1978
Despite its seeming inevitability, no definitive judicial statement
on preemption and the CEA emerged from any cases decided between
1974 and 1978 that considered the amended jurisdictional provisions of
the CEA. Some courts avoided a comprehensive treatment of the pre-
emption issue by relying on the "hold-over" provisions of section
412.190 Others simply held in favor of preemption but did not indicate
in any significant detail the factors leading to their decision. For exam-
ple, in State v. Monex International, Ltd ,191 a state court held that "it is
clear" that the newly created CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction to regu-
late an exchange's margin account sales of silver coins.192 However,
the opinion contained virtually no analysis of the reasons prompting
this conclusion. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Texas, relying on
Monex, held that the jurisdiction of the CFTC with respect to London
options was exclusive. 193 Although, on this basis, the court dismissed
as moot a suit brought by the state to enjoin the defendant's sale of
such options, it too failed to elaborate on the reasons behind its
holding. 194
In International Trading, Ltd v. Bell,195 the Supreme Court of Ar-
kansas attempted a comparatively more thorough evaluation of pre-
emption under the amended version of the CEA. The Arkansas
Securities Commission, relying on the Arkansas Securities Act, had
brought an action to prohibit the defendant from engaging in fraudu-
lent practices in connection with the sale of London options. After re-
viewing some of the previously discussed cases and the legislative
history of the CEA, the court dismissed the suit. It found that the state
law could not be enforced because the CEA had preempted the field of
commodities regulation. A significant aspect of the court's decision
was its rejection of the argument advanced by the Arkansas Securities
189. See text accompanying notes 73-81 supra.
190. See, e.g., State v. Coin Wholesalers, Inc., 311 Minn. 346, 250 N.W.2d 583 (1976); People
v. Monex Int'l, Ltd., 86 Misc. 2d 320, 380 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1975).
191. 527 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
192. Id at 806.
193. Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Mouer, 531 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1975) (per curiam).
194. Id at 806.
195. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,495.
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Commissioner that enforcement of the state regulatory scheme should
be permitted when the state act is not in actual conflict with the federal
act. Relying on section 2(a)(1) of the CEA, the court noted that
"Where, . . . as here, Congress has made it clear that authority con-
ferred by it is exclusive in a given area the states cannot exercise con-
comitant or supplementary regulatory authority over the identical
activity." 196 The court added that preemption occurs even if a state law
is not actually an obstacle to federal enforcement since "the potential
for obstacles is just as important as their existence."' 97 Unable to char-
acterize as unfounded the congressional determination that commodity
trading demanded exclusive federal regulation, the court suggested that
the state, consistent with the CEA, rely not on its securities laws but on
the general fraud provisions of its criminal code to protect its citizens
from fraud. 98
Position of CFTC on Question of Preemption
The CFTC consistently reinforced and encouraged these early de-
cisions, holding that the CEA, as amended, displaced state regulatory
authority in the field of commodities trading. This is itself significant.
In Skidmore v. Swift & Co. ,199 the Supreme Court observed that:
[Tihe rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator [of
an administrative agency], while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and in-
formed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the valid-
ity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.2°°
Thus, it is notable that a spokesman for the CFTC carefully explained
the position of his agency:
[B]eyond any reasonable dispute . . . the Act totally preempts any
state licensing or registration provisions. Further, we think it is clear
that any form of state regulation, as such, of any persons, entities or
activities affecting or involving trading in commodity futures con-
tracts, the sale of gold and silver coin and bullion on margin, or com-
modity options would be inconsistent with the pervasive regulatory
scheme established by Congress. Today, state regulation of any sort
196. Id at 21,996. The decision here refutes the position advanced in Preemption Note, supra
note 188, at 486-87.
197. Id (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1946)).
198. Id
199. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
200. Id at 140.
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would be preempted under the Supremacy clause of Article VI of the
Constitution.201
The CFTC, however, never suggested that the states were without any
authority to protect their citizens against the fraud sometimes associ-
ated with commodity transactions unlawful under the CEA. In seem-
ing concurrence with the advice of the Arkansas Supreme Court, the
CFTC specified that it did "not believe that the states are preempted
from prosecuting fraud under state laws of general application. The
important concept is that the fraud statute must be of general applica-
tion and is not part of some narrower state regulatory scheme." 202
This, of course, precluded the states from applying their securities
laws to commodity transactions. Under this view, the only permissible
enforcement measures were those which would "induce compliance
with the federal regulatory scheme. ' 20 3 Although, according to this in-
terpretation, the states were precluded from applying their own securi-
ties laws to commodity transactions, they were permitted to enforce
their general fraud statutes and enjoin violations of the CEA by bring-
ing suit under the doctrine ofparenspatriae.2°4 The objective of the
CFTC was simply to maintain regulatory uniformity under standards
established by the CEA and interpreted by the CFTC. Indeed, to facil-
itate consistent and cooperative enforcement efforts, the CFTC estab-
lished a committee to act as a liaison between the CFTC and state
officials in matters of mutual concern. 205
Despite these efforts by the CFTC to delimit an appropriate regu-
latory sphere for the states, various securities commissioners bridled at
the suggestion that they rely onparenspatriae suits and enforcement of
general antifraud statutes to protect their citizens from fraud associated
with commodities trading. They argued that such measures were un-
productive as well as time and resource consuming, and insisted that
201. Remarks of CFTC Vice-Chairman John Rainbolt, reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer
Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,075 at 20,706-07 [hereinafter cited as Rainbolt]; see also
CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 76-19 11975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,213; CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 76-20 11975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,214.
202. Rainbolt, supra note 201, at 20,707; see also The States' Two-Fold Commodities Enforce-
ment Role.- State Parens Patriae Suits to Uphold the Commodity Exchange Act and State Prosecu-
tions Under General Criminal Antifraud Statutes, CFTC, Office of General Counsel Release,
reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,218 [hereinafter cited as
Parens Patriae Suits].
203. Rainbolt, supra note 201, at 20,707.
204. Parenspatriae is a concept of standing which, in some instances, permits state attorneys
general or other officials to bring actions in federal court on behalf of state residents. See Parens
Palriae Suits, supra note 202, at 21,187-91.
205. See 41 Fed. Reg. 13,393 (1976); see also Russo & Lyon, supra note 188, at 71 n.56.
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effective trader protection would not be possible without permission to
prosecute under the more specific requirements of state securities
laws.20 6 Dissatisfied with the position of the CFTC, and rebuffed by
their own courts in their efforts to bring enforcement actions under
state laws, these officials resolved that the extent of state regulatory au-
thority would become a primary issue in the 1978 hearings on congres-
sional reauthorization of the CFTC.
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1978 AMENDMENTS
Investigation into Effectiveness of CFTC
THE WHITTEN REPORT
Two major federal investigations into the effectiveness of the
CFTC were completed, and their findings released, just as the CFTC
congressional reauthorization proceedings began. The Whitten Report
had been prepared for use by a subcommittee of the House Committee
on Appropriations. 20 7 Among other things, it attempted "[t]o deter-
mine the effect of the 1974 Act on the States, and the relationship be-
tween CFTC and the States," and to evaluate the efforts of the CFTC
to regulate the trading of commodity options.20 8
The Whitten Report accepted as "evident" that Congress "clearly
intended" to grant the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over commodity
transactions.20 9 Nevertheless, it criticized the CFTC's "aggressive as-
sertion" of this exclusive jurisdiction.210 It believed this had not only
seriously strained the relationship between the CFTC and the states
but, more significantly, had effectively prevented "the enforcement re-
sources of the securities agencies of the several States. . . from taking
action in the field of commodity futures and commodity options." 21'
Although the Whitten Report was plainly sympathetic to views ex-
pressed by the SEC and state officials that concurrent state jurisdiction
is necessary to augment the enforcement resources of the CFTC, it did
not believe the states could assert any enforcement role without an
amendment to the CEA. The report recognized that "[tihe exclusive
Federal jurisdiction established by the CFTC Act obviously was
designed to prevent a proliferation of commodity-related legislation by
206. See Russo & Lyon, supra note 188, at 71.
207. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 95TH CONG., 2d SEss., INVESTIGATIVE
STUDY ON THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (Comm. Print 1978).
208. Id at 3.
209. Id at 130.
210. Id at 129.
211. Id
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the States. ' 212 It also acknowledged that "[s]uch proliferation of
widely disparate laws could be a serious burden on the industry and
could negate the efforts of CFTC to maintain an orderly market. ''213
The only role the Whitten Report reasonably foresaw for state officials
was in the limited area of fraud and consumer protection, and this only
if "appropriate legislative language could be developed which would
permit the States to enforce their laws if they are not inconsistent with
the Commodity Exchange Act and subject to the supremacy clause of
the Constitution. '214
THE GAO STUDY
The study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) was more
comprehensive than the Whitten Report. 215 It had been undertaken
pursuant to the mandatory review provisions of section 8 of the CEA
and in anticipation of the CFTC reauthorization proceedings. Al-
though the GAO Study was critical of some aspects of the CFTC's reg-
ulatory efforts-particularly in the area of options trading-it was
emphatic in its conclusion that the CFTC should be reauthorized.2 1 6
The conclusions of the GAO Study were strikingly similar to those
of the Whitten Report. The GAO agreed that "[tlhe 1974 act, in giving
CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over commodity matters, effectively pre-
empted the States and SEC from the field of commodity regulation,
including the prosecution of fraudulent activity. ' 217 Thus, although
the GAO favored a general regulatory role for the states, it did not
believe this would be possible without an amendment to the CEA. The
GAO's assessment that state enforcement authority was desirable was
closely tied to its perception that commodity options trading had been
ineffectively regulated by the independent actions of the CFTC. Like
the Whitten Report, the GAO Study found that the CFTC had prema-
turely asserted its exclusive jurisdiction, thereby creating--due to the
CFTC's understaffing and limited experience-a regulatory gap
"which has been exploited by fraudulent option dealers. ' 218 Despite
these perceived shortcomings, the GAO Study did not dispute the va-
212. Id at 137.
213. Id
214. Id
215. Regulation of the Commodity Futures Markets-What Needs to Be Done, U.S. Gen. Ac-
counting Office Doc. No. CED-78-1 10 (May 17, 1978) [hereinafter cited as GAO Study).
216. Id at 15.
217. Id at 186.
218. Id
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lidity of the CFTC's claim of exclusive jurisdiction. To the contrary,
the authors of the study stressed that:
[We are] not challenging CFTC's interpretation of its exclusive juris-
diction ... or questioning its authority to act as it has in asserting
that jurisdiction. We believe, however, that in its early deliberations
concerning whether to attempt to regulate options or to place a mora-
torium on their trading, CFTC should have given more considera-
tion to the factor of exclusive jurisdiction and to its implications for
effective enforcement of option regulations. We believe, also, that in
view of the mounting evidence that its interim regulatory program
was not providing the essential customer protections that had been
promised, CFTC should have been more mindful of and responsive
to the views of State and Federal regulatory officials who had been
effectively preempted from the field of commodity options but who
were, perhaps, better equipped and better staffed than CFTC to con-
trol the problem.2 19
Consistent with this conclusion that state enforcement experience and
resources were underutilized, the GAO urged Congress to amend the
CEA "to permit any State securities commission or other State author-
ity to investigate and prosecute options fraud and other forms of com-
modity-related fraud under State blue sky or other antifraud
statutes." 22
0
However, the GAO Study recognized that even with such an
amendment, the states could enforce their antifraud statutes only to the
extent that "such State agency or authority does not take action which
conflicts with the Commodity Exchange Act or the rules and regula-
tions thereunder. ' '221 Under this limitation, a state could never use its
bucket-shop laws to prohibit the trading of stock index futures con-
tracts approved by the CFTC pursuant to its powers under the CEA.
Indeed, even the GAO Study implicitly sanctioned and deferred to the
authority of the CFTC to approve trading in stock index futures. In
discussing the role of the SEC relative to futures regulation, the GAO
Study urged Congress to amend the CEA and transfer to the SEC "ju-
risdiction over futures contracts written on all securities subject to the
registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, including indexes
of such securities.' '222 With respect to futures contracts written on se-
curities exempt from registration requirements, the GAO Study sug-
gested that the CEA be amended to permit the SEC "to bring an
enforcement action under ... the Securities Act of 1933, subject to
219. Id at 188-89 (emphasis added).
220. Id at 211.
221. Id
222. Id at 12 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
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CFTC's prior right to act. '223
The manner in which the GAO Study advised this transfer of ju-
risdiction to the SEC is significant. Nowhere did the Study challenge
the validity under the CEA of futures contracts based on stock indices.
The appropriateness of such indices as instruments for futures trading
was unquestioned. The concern of the GAO was jurisdictional-the
issue was who should regulate stock index futures, not whether they
were permitted under the CEA. Although the GAO Study would have
resolved this concern in favor of the SEC, it admitted that until there
was an amendment to the contrary, the CEA vested all regulatory au-
thority over futures contracts, including those based on stock indices, in
the CFTC alone. Further, despite the pronounced desire of the GAO
to involve state expertise in the regulation of commodities trading, no
mention was made of any presumed power of the states to thwart the
trading of stock index futures--either through archaic bucket-shop
laws or existing securities laws. Indeed, in discussing the specific pros-
pects for such instruments, the GAO Study suggested that regulatory
authority should vest not in the states, but in either the SEC or the SEC
and CFTC jointly.224 As will be seen, Congress rejected even these
alternatives and unequivocally affirmed the vesting of sole authority in
the CFTC.
House Hearings
In February, 1978, the House Subcommittee on Conservation and
Credit began hearings on H.R. 10285, "a bill to extend the Commodity
Exchange Act, as amended, for four years." Battle lines over the issue
of the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction began to form quite early in these
hearings. The vice-chairman of the CFTC, in his introductory state-
ment to the subcommittee, urged passage of an amendment to the CEA
"to provide a method to encourage states to enforce the Federal law
and Commission regulations under it."225
In the view of the CFTC, the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of
the CEA invalidated all state statutes, including bucket-shop laws,
which directly or indirectly represented efforts by the states to regulate
commodity trading. The amendment urged by the CFTC purported to
codify only those enforcement tools already available to, but rarely
223. Id (emphasis added).
224. Id at 12-14.
225. Extend Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.i? 10285 Before the Subcommittee on
Conservation & Credit ofthe House Committee on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as 1978 House Hearings] (statement of John Rainbolt).
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used by, the states. It permitted the states to prosecute commodity-
related fraud under consumer protection or criminal fraud statutes. 226
Additionally, it sought to expressly authorize states to bring suits as
parenspatriae to enforce the provisions of the CEA and the related
rules, regulations and orders approved by the CFTC.227 Enforcement
actions, however, would not have been permitted under local securities
laws or other regulatory-oriented legislation, including bucket-shop
laws. As Commissioner Rainbolt noted in response to a question re-
garding preemption:
The idea behind the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the Commis-
sion was to simplify and centralize regulation of the commodity mar-
ket. You have always had a problem throughout history with State
regulation of commodity markets. . . . This goes back quite a ways
to when they declared futures contracts as illegal gambling contracts
and could not be enforced because in many cases they did not con-
template delivery of the commodity.228
Since bucket-shop laws were enacted with commodity-related fraud
specifically in mind, they assumed regulatory dimensions. Thus, they
too would fall within the preemptive scope of the exclusive jurisdiction
provisions of the CEA, regardless of the amendment suggested by the
CFTC.
State Testimony
Extensive comments on the jurisdictional issue were also received
from various state officials. The first such statement was from the Wis-
consin Commissioner of Securities, who charged that the effect of the
exclusive jurisdiction provision of the CEA had been "to hamstring the
efforts of the various states effectively to prevent or curtail widespread
fraud and abuses in the offer and sale of commodity options contracts,
margin and leverage agreements. . . and other commodity-related in-
vestments. ' ' 229 He noted that prior to the 1974 amendments, the bulk
of state regulatory and prosecutorial activity centered on commodity-
related investments such as commodity options and margin or leverage
contracts and described how "numerous actions" had been brought as
a result of this aggressive state posture. He contended, however, that
the 1974 amendments had "seriously curtailed the ability of the states
226. Id at 63. For the earlier view of the current CFTC Chairman disputing the CFTC posi-
tion that civil consumer protection statutes can be invoked despite the exclusive jurisdiction provi-
sion of the CEA, see Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Reauthorization
Process."A Viewfrom the Trenches, I DET. C.L. REV. 1, 20 n.122 (1979).
227. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 225, at 63.
228. Id at 80.
229. Id at 123 (statement of Conrad Goodkind).
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to prevent or prosecute fraudulent activities in connection with the sale
of commodity-related investments. ' 230 The Wisconsin Commissioner
also alleged-erroneously-that "no state securities administrator was
aware that [exclusive jurisdiction] language was under consideration,
and none testified at hearings in connection with the legislation." 23' To
prevent the "continuing loss of hundreds of millions of dollars annually
in commodity-related frauds," he proposed amending section 2(a)(1) of
the CEA to "permit state and S.E.C. antifraud actions where commodi-
ties fraud would also constitute a fraud under federal or state securities
laws." 232
When questioned by committee members, Commissioner Good-
kind rejected the position of the CFTC that, regardless of the CFTC's
exclusive jurisdiction, states could bring effective enforcement actions
against commodity-related fraud under either the doctrine ofparenspa-
triae or antifraud statutes of general jurisdiction under the general
criminal code. As he explained:
The problems with proceeding under either of the two doctrines
that the Commission has outlined are, first of all, as to parens patriae,
it is a very tenuous doctrine. Not all the courts have recognized it
and have only recognized it in limited circumstances. Suit can only
be brought under that theory by the Attorneys General of the States,
not by the regulators or by the enforcement agencies which are most
familiar with financial crimes.
You have the same problem as to the antifraud statute of gen-
eral jurisdiction which is that they can only be brought by the attor-
neys general. But in addition to that, you have a very serious proof
problem in that the standard of proof under a criminal statute of
general jurisdiction is intentional wrongdoing, whereas the standard
of proof under the securities law and the commodities law is willful
misconduct.
In the financial crimes area, it is very difficult, if not impossible,
to establish intentional wrongdoing.233
Comments similarly critical of CFTC exclusive jurisdiction were
received from the securities commissioners of Texas234 and Minne-
sota 235 and from the Massachusetts Secretary of State.236 A letter re-
ceived from the Texas official is notable simply because it admitted
that, from a state perspective, a bucket-shop law is a form of commod-
230. Id at 124-25.
231. Id at 125.
232. Id at 131-32.
233. Id at 173.
234. Id at 363-65 (letter from Richard Latham).
235. Id at 383 (statement of John Larson).
236. Id at 375 (statement of Paul Guzzi).
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ity futures regulation preempted by the 1974 amendments.237 The testi-
mony of Massachusetts Secretary of State Guzzi was more pointed. He
advised the committee to "abolish the exclusive jurisdiction of the
CFTC and the consequent preemption of state action against commod-
ity-related fraud. '238
The testimony of the securities commissioner of Minnesota was
not as extreme as that of Secretary Guzzi. Yet, it similarly urged the
curtailing of the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction so as to permit the states
to use their own securities antifraud provisions and personnel against
fraud related to commodity investment contracts. When questioned by
the commitee, Commissioner Larson emphasized that the states were
seeking only "an antifraud provision at the State level which is identi-
cal to what is contained in the CFTC Act which is also identical to
what is contained in the Securities and Exchange Act." 239 He noted
that the states contemplated only a narrow role and were "not inter-
ested in getting into the area of regulating, that is, adopting rules, set-
ting standards, determining what contracts can be sold, licensing the
people, et cetera." 24° Even Representative Glickman, perhaps the most
vocal congressional critic of the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction, con-
curred with this view, believing that a circumscribed role for the states
was "appropriate." 24'
Stock Index Futures
It is clear from the hearings that Congress was fully aware of the
brewing controversy over stock index futures. Discussion of these in-
struments first arose in the context of whether the CFTC should retain
exclusive jurisdiction over a futures contract regardless of the underly-
ing commodity. In his testimony, SEC Chairman Harold Williams re-
237. The Texas Commissioner wrote that, prior to the 1974 CEA amendments, "Texas had
never chosen to regulate commodity futures except to enact a bucket-shop law." Id at 363 (letter
from Richard Latham). This characterization of bucket-shop statutes as a form of commodities
regulation is consistent with the view taken by the CFTC. See text accompanying notes 225-28
supra .
238. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 225, at 379. Secretary Guzzi also warned that the Com-
modity Options Fraud Task Force which he headed was considering recommending abolishing
the CFTC. Id at 381.
239. Id at 439 (testimony of John Larson).
240. Id Notwithstanding preemption, the position advanced by the Minnesota official would,
by inference, preclude even an attempt by a state to apply bucket-shop statutes to prevent trading
in stock index futures. If, as presented here, the states were not interested in setting standards or
determining what contracts could be sold, they would, presumably, defer to CFTC decisions on
such matters and not try to circumvent or undermine these decisions by evaluating them accord-
ing to the standards of nineteenth-century legislation.
241. Id at 440.
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ferred to an application before the CFTC seeking contract market
designation for a stock index futures contract. He cited as a major
regulatory concern of the SEC the possibility that:
[Als the number of futures contracts on securities continues to rise,
the activity in the futures market may have a significant effect upon
the market for the underlying securities, and visa-versa. Yet, because
there is jurisdiction in the CFTC over the futures market for these se-
curities, and there is jurisdiction in our Commission over the under-
lying markets in these same securities, the potential for conflicting or
duplicative regulation is necessarily increased .... 242
Accordingly, Commissioner Williams urged Congress to:
[A]mend the definition of the term "commodity" in Section 2 of the
Commodity Exchange Act expressly to exclude any goods, articles,
services, rights or interests which constitute or involve a "security"
within the meaning of the federal securities laws. In addition, a new
provision should be added to the Commodity Exchange Act making
clear that it is the Securities and Exchange Commission, and not the
CFTC, that is vested with jurisdiction over all accounts, agreements,
and transactions involving contracts for the sale of a "security" for
future delivery.243
Witnesses from the GAO, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) and the Chicago Board Options Exchange echoed the views
expressed by Chairman Williams and similarly recommended transfer-
ring to the SEC the CFTC's "current" authority over futures contracts
based on securities.24"
Many comments from committee members during these hearings
involved futures contracts based on securities generally and stock index
futures particularly. Representative Glickman, in response to testi-
mony that the range of CFTC jurisdiction and authority included
"cash markets related to the transfer of the commodities named in the
Commodity Exchange Act, as well as any other commodity on which a
futures contract exists," 245 expressed concern "about the incredible
amount of capital that may be flowing out of the securities markets into
futures markets." 246 Noting that an application to commence trading
in stock index futures was pending, he questioned whether "there are
certain nontraditional commodity areas such as financial instruments
that more properly belong within the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission as opposed to the jurisdiction of [the
242. Id at 189-90 (statement of Harold Williams) (emphasis added).
243. Id at 209.
244. Id at IV-VI.
245. Id at 111 (statement of John Rainbolt).
246. Id at 113 (statement of Rep. Dan Glickman).
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CFTC]. ' '247 It is significant that, like the authors of the GAO Study, 248
Representative Glickman did not question the legitimacy of a futures
contract based on securities stock indices. His only concern was vesting
regulatory authority in the proper agency. This jurisdictional emphasis
is implicit in his inquiry of witnesses:
Do you gentlemen believe that all futures trading is the same, or
do you believe there is a fundamental difference between trading fu-
tures of a commodity or historical commodity, let us say under the
Commodities Exchange Act, and trading futures on Treasury Bills
and futures on Dow Jones indexes, and futures on things which re-
ally are not historical commodities at all? Is there a difference, and,
if so, should those be separate in terms of regulatory functions?
Should the SEC take over the regulation, at least with respect to the
antifraud provisions of those things?249
The most extended consideration of stock index futures resulted
from a direct question by the subcommittee's chairman as to the
CFTC's position on a proposed futures contract based on the Dow
Jones index.250 In response, the CFTC Chairman emphasized that a
stock index futures contract is a hedging mechanism, and argued that
"[t]he real question on Dow Jones is not the delivery of securities. It is
a question of whether there is an economic purpose to hedging that
arithmetical average."'25 '
CFTC Vice-Chairman Rainbolt elaborated on these comments
and warned the subcommittee that if jurisdiction over securities futures
contracts were transferred to the SEC, "you would probably not see
S. . full development of the economic potential for commodity mar-
kets that might be available and that is free for development under the
1974 amendment giving CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over all futures
trading. ' 252 Relative to the proposed stock index futures contract, he
queried rhetorically:
In what environment will the Dow Jones futures be examined? Will
it be examined in an environment, as the CFTC would apply, that
would try to assess its fitness and suitability as a risk-shifting mecha-
nism and a hedging mechanism for the economy or will it be evalu-
ated as a security?
If it is evaluated as a security, there is a high degree of likeli-
hood you will never see a Dow Jones future at all. 253
247. Id at 113-14.
248. See notes 222-24 supra and accompanying text.
249. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 225, at 176.
250. Id at 610 (statement of Rep. Ed Jones).
251. Id (statement of William Bagley).
252. Id at 611 (statement of John Rainbolt).
253. Id at 611-12.
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Another representative of the CFTC described for the subcommit-
tee the functional difference between securities and futures markets.
He explained that the former "is simply a cash market where people
buy a product and take title and delivery immediately. ' 254 On the
other hand:
The futures market is quite different from that. People contract
for purchase or sale at a specific price for a given time in the future.
The purpose is not to acquire title and take delivery of the product.
The purpose is to offset the risk of a change in price during the time
interval which is indicated in the contract.
If you try to cross these purposes and do not recognize the func-
tional distinction, I think the whole matter will become hopelessly
confused. 255
The final reference to stock index futures was by the chairman of
the subcommittee who asked whether, as proposed by the GAO, an
interagency council---composed of representatives of the CFTC, SEC,
Treasury and other departments-would assist the CFTC in regulating
futures contracts in securities. 256 The question suggested that forma-
tion of such a council was being considered as a reasonable alternative
to a transfer of authority from the CFTC to the SEC.257 It also implied
a recognition that the CFTC already had the exclusive authority to au-
thorize and regulate futures contracts based on securities, including
stock index futures.
Mark- Up
STOCK INDEX FUTURES SANCTIONED
In mark-up, the subcommittee rejected an amendment proposed
by Representative Glickman that would have deleted from the CEA
definition of commodity "any contract for future delivery of any secu-
rity required to be registered under section 12 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934."1258 Significantly, Representative Glickman's
proposal would still have specifically included within the definition of
commodity "futures of any index of such securities or any aggregation
or pool of different securities. ' 259 He believed that a futures contract
written on a specific security would actually be a variant of a stock
option, an instrument already subject to the regulatory authority of the
254. Id at 613 (statement of Read Dunn).
255. Id
256. Id at 613-14.
257. Id at 614 (statement of William Bagley).
258. H.R. REP. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1978).
259. Id (emphasis added).
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SEC.260 Nevertheless, he perceived that, despite their novelty, "futures
on indexes or aggregates of securities may serve an economic pur-
pose."261 Thus, rather than frustrate the development of an economi-
cally useful hedging device, Representative Glickman simply wanted to
encourage the CEA to proceed with caution in acting on applications
for such futures contracts.262
The Committee on Agriculture appeared to heed Representative
Glickman's concern. After mark-up, the full committee recommended
that Congress amend the CEA and formalize the CFTC practice of
soliciting the views of other federal agencies prior to designating con-
tract markets for the trading of futures contracts based on financial in-
struments. This recommendation was a decisive rejection of the
position advanced in the hearings by the SEC, the OMB, the GAO, and
by state officials. Not only did it reaffirm the congressional view that
futures contracts based on securities indices were legitimate trading in-
struments under the CEA, but it also made clear that regulatory au-
thority should be based on the economic function of the transaction,
not the underlying commodity. As the committee noted:
Congress was aware in 1974 that proposals for futures trading in
financial instruments and Government securities were being devel-
oped by the futures industry. Recognizing the risk-shifting andprice-
discovery functions of the futures markets, regulation of futures con-
tracts on financial instruments and Government securities under the
Commodity Exchange Act was vested in the single expert agency that
had been created to administer the Act--the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission. 263
Although mindful of the pending proposal for stock index futures,
and of the position of the SEC favoring the transfer to it of jurisdiction
over futures contracts written on financial instruments and other secur-
ities, the committee expressed its belief that:
[T]he Congressional judgment in 1974 to maintain the traditional
horizontal regulatory approach to commodity futures trading under
the Commodity Exchange Act is sound. The Committee is of the
view that jurisdiction over futures markets should reside in an
agency such as the Commission whose regulatory role requires an
260. Id Apparently, the CFTC agrees with this position. In the House hearings, its represen-
tatives, although emphasizing that the futures field was ever expanding, asserted that despite the
possible development'of stock index futures, the CFTC was "not going to start a futures market in
[specific stocks] or in any other listed stock. That is, in effect, a stock option. 1978 House
Hearings, supra note 225, at 610 (statement of William Bagley).
261. H.R. REP. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1978). It was at the urging of Representa-
tive Glickman that language to this effect was included in the House Report. Id
262. Id
263. Id at 13 (emphasis added).
PREEMPTION AND THE CEA
economic expertise which focuses upon the risk-shpiling andprice-deter-
miningfunction that futures tradingperforms. Futures markets have
not remained static and futures regulations have covered an increas-
ing number of commodities as the benefits of futures trading [have]
become more widely understood. The Committee does not believe
that the public interest would be served by duplicating in one or
more additional agencies regulatory authority over futures markets
that presently exists in the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission.26
4
Accordingly, noting that the CFTC has always solicited the views of
federal agencies whose area of interest might be affected by the
designation of a contract market for the trading of financial instrument
futures,265 the committee advised that "H.R. 10285 retains and formal-
izes this practice in order to assure that communication between the
Commission and these agencies will continue." 266
Although it understood the fears expressed by the SEC that futures
contracts based on equity or debt securities of a single issuer might be
developed and might have an adverse impact on the cash market for
the underlying securities, the committee stressed that it did "not believe
that the same considerations necessarily would apply to any proposal
for trading in a futures contract based upon an aggregate or pool of a
number of different securities or an index involving such an aggre-
gate. '267 It believed that such indices "may reasonably be expected to
serve a valid economic function. '268 Consequently, citing reassurances
from the CFTC that it would solicit SEC views before designating a
contract market to trade futures involving securities, the committee
simply encouraged the CFTC to proceed with caution and considera-
tion for the proper functioning of the market for the underlying securi-
ties. At no time during its extended analysis did the committee express
any doubts as to the validity of stock index futures. Its only concern
was with jurisdiction over such futures, a concern which it clearly re-
solved in favor of the CFTC.
GENERAL STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY: SUBSECTION 6d
The committee's approach toward the issue of state regulatory au-
thority was similar to that which it took relative to the jurisdictional
claims over securities based futures-the committee simply recom-
mended codifying those powers which the CFTC had assured the com-
264. Id (emphasis added).
265. See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 225, at 613-14 (statement of William Bagley).
266. H.R. REP. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978).
267. Id
268. Id
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mittee the states already possessed. In doing so, the committee refused
to adopt an amendment suggested by Representative Baldus that
would have authorized the states to investigate and prosecute in state
courts violations of state laws identical to the provisions of the CEA.269
The committee expressed its concern that such a measure could result
in conflicting interpretations among state courts and "cause confusion
and disruption among the regulated persons. '270
As an alternative, the committee proposed adding subsection 6d to
the CEA. Subsection 6d(l) of the CEA provided that the states would
have the authority to investigate and prosecute civil actions in federal
district court for violations of the CEA, section 217 of the 1974 amend-
ments, or rules and regulations promulgated by the CFTC.27 1 The
committee declared its intent that this subsection would empower the
states to seek civil relief against those "who perpetrate fraudulent and
other practices made unlawful by the Federal law., 272 It further quali-
fied the authority of the states by prohibiting them from investigating
or bringing suits "against a designated contract market, licensed Board
of Trade or clearing organization. 273 The committee wanted the power
to enforce the CEA with respect to organized exchanges to remain solely
in the CFTC.274 Indeed, the committee viewed the creation of these
rights of action in the states only as a supplement to the CFTC's own
enforcement activities. 275
Subsection 6d(2) proposed to empower the states to enforce the
CEA asparenspatriae where a state could show that the violation of
the CEA has harmed or is causing harm to the welfare of its citizens.2 76
In subsection 6d(3), the committee sought to clarify that, despite the
exclusive jurisdiction provision of section 2(a)(1), "States may con-
tinue, as in the past, to enforce their own antifraud and other criminal
statutes ofgeneral application in order to assure that the residents of the
States are fully protected against improper activities in commodity-re-
lated transactions. '277
269. Id at 47.
270. Id at 16.
271. Id at 15.
272. Id
273. Id
274. Id at 15-16.
275. Id at 16.
276. Id
277. Id (emphasis added).
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House Consideration
The House of Representatives considered these proposed amend-
ments to the CEA in July, 1978. In his introductory remarks, Agricul-
ture Chairman Foley advised Congress of the jurisdictional concerns
expressed by the SEC relative to futures trading in financial instru-
ments. He expressed the committee's conclusion, however, "that juris-
diction over futures markets should continue to reside in a single
agency, such as the [CFTC), whose regulatory role requires an eco-
nomic expertise which focuses upon the risk shifting and price deter-
mining function that futures trading performs." 278
Perhaps persuaded by Representative Foley's proselytizing zeal,
Representative Glickman arose and announced that he no longer re-
sisted his committee's decision not to recommend allowing the SEC a
regulatory role over contract futures based on securities. As he noted:
I strongly support the [CFTC] jurisdiction over futures on financial
instruments as opposed to giving that jurisdiction to the Securities
and Exchange Commission. I originally had supported the SEC re-
taining jurisdiction, but I have changed my mind, because I think
there is a difference fundamentally and economically between fu-
tures and securities. I hope we will give that authority to the
CFTC.
2 7 9
In a subsequent session, Representative Glickman repeated this
position but offered an amendment-which was subsequently
adopted-"clarifying" that a purpose of the CFTC's communicating
with affected agencies prior to designating a contract market for securi-
ties futures contracts is to consider "the relationship between the vol-
ume and nature of investment and trading in futures contracts under
the jurisdiction of the Commission and in securities and/or financial
instruments under the jurisdiction of such agencies. '280
The entire issue of securities-based futures was thoroughly consid-
ered and deliberated in hearings, in mark-up sessions and during de-
bate of the full House. Indeed, even Representative Glickman, in
presenting his amendment, assured his colleagues that his committee
had "discussed in depth the role of the CFTC and the SEC in the
whole issue of futures on securities and futures on indexes."' 28 1 It is
significant, therefore, that despite such a thoughtful review, no member
of Congress ever expressed any reservation as to the validity of the
278. 124 CONG. REC. 22,317 (1978).
279. Id at 22,321.
280. Id at 22,650.
281. Id
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CFTC approving trading in stock index futures. Such instruments
seemed appropriate, if not inevitable, under authority of the expanded
definition of commodity included in the amended CEA. Consequently,
the House, in these proceedings, accepted stock index futures as a fore-
gone conclusion. The issue no longer was whether there should be
stock index futures, but who should regulate them. Havinig decided
this question in favor of the CFTC, the House, in approving Represen-
tative Glickman's amendment, was simply urging the CFTC to con-
sider the possible effect on capital markets as a factor in acting on
specific proposals for futures based on financial instruments.
The other major jurisdictional issue considered by the House was
what regulatory role, if any, should vest in the states. Representative
Foley offered a "perfecting amendment" to proposed section 6d to "de-
lete the necessity of demonstrating that the State is acting under the
parenspatriae doctrine. ' 282 Although the House accepted this amend-
ment,283 it rejected the "Baldus amendment," which was reintroduced
despite its defeat in committee. During the debate on the Baldus pro-
posal to permit states to pass laws identical to the CEA and enforce
them in state courts, many comments addressed the issue of whether
any obstacles actually prevented states from bringing commodity-re-
lated actions in federal courts. Representative Glickman, speaking in
support of the Baldus amendment, cited information supplied by the
National Association of States' Attorneys General which indicated that
"33 States in this country are either partially or fully restricted from
ever going into Federal court on these types of matters." 28 Represen-
tative English, however, who had authored section 6d as proposed by
the Committee on Agriculture, was critical of these arguments in favor
of a stronger state role. As he noted:
With regard to the issue pertaining to the State's opportunity to
prosecute, much has been said about the fact that today the Federal
law precluded the States from taking action in this area. However,
up until 1974, when the CFTC was created, the States had a virtual
blank check with regard to this matter. States were allowed to pass
their own laws, to bring about their own prosecutions, and to effect
their own enforcements of those State laws. However, the reason
why we have a CFTC is due to the fact that most States had not done
so. Therefore, the Federal Government stepped into the breech and
filled the gap to bring about a uniform law under which the industry
could live. This is the reason we have the CFTC.
285
282. Id at 22,861.
283. Id at 22,862.
284. Id at 22,863.
285. Id at 22,864.
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Other legislators expressed their support for Representative Eng-
lish's position. Some even urged that it was state law-not federal
law-which was preventing states from bringing actions in federal
courts. These representatives insisted that, instead of reenacting a state
version of the CEA (as would have been necessary under the Baldus
amendment), it would be much easier for these thirty-three states to
amend their laws to remove any statutory limitation preventing the at-
torney general or other designated state official from entering federal
court to enforce federal laws. 286 Apparently agreeing that the Baldus
proposal was not an effective means to secure uniform regulation of
commodity trading, the House rejected the amendment, 141 in favor,
260 opposed.287 H.R. 10285 itself, however, was overwhelmingly ap-
proved by a vote of 401 to 6.288
Senate Hearings
As in the earlier House hearings, the predominant subject of inter-
est in the Senate hearings on the reauthorization of the CFTC was the
CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction. Securities officials of various states
again argued in favor of amending the CEA to permit and encourage,
in the area of commodities trading, state enforcement authority compa-
rable to that already exercised by the states in the securities field. In-
dustry representatives, however, were just as vigorous in denouncing
such a proposal and in urging the continued preemption of a state regu-
latory role. Throughout these hearings, these officials emphasized the
need for uniformity and warned of the confusion that could result from
the imposition of varying and conflicting standards by different states.
They expressed concern that state regulatory authority would burden
interstate commerce and cited, as evidence, problems which had re-
sulted from the stringent registration program imposed by the state of
Wisconsin. 289 One witness even asserted that it was the inadequacy of
state regulatory enforcement measures which accounted for the com-
modity option scandals of the early 1970's and which necessitated vest-
ing control in a strong central agency.290
286. Id at 22,865.
287. Id at 22,866-67.
288. Id at 22,877-78.
289. Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearings on S 2391
Before the Subcommittee on Agricultural Research & General Legislation of the Senate Committee
on Agriculture, Nutrition & Forestry, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978
Senate Hearings]. These hearings were held in response to the filing of S. 2391, a reauthorization
bill for the CFTC filed by Senator Huddleston on January 19, 1978. See 124 CONG. REC. 34
(1978).
290. 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 289, at 172 (statement of Robert Wilmouth).
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As in the House hearings, there was virtual unanimity among par-
ticipants in the Senate hearings that the 1974 amendments had pre-
empted a state regulatory role. State securities officials, by their
presence and in their testimony urging less restrictive amendments,
demonstrated that they accepted that this had been the consequence of
the earlier legislation. Similarly, no member of the Senate disputed the
preemptive effect of the 1974 CEA amendments. The CFTC itself sug-
gested that the resurgence of commodity-related trading abuses was
partially attributable to preemption. Chairman Bagley testified that the
CFTC's premature assertion of its exclusive jurisdiction had created a
regulatory vacuum which the CFTC, during its start-up phase, was un-
able to fill because of inadequate funding, staffing and experience. 29'
Other testimony at these hearings considered whether the regula-
tory authority of the CFTC should be shared with other federal agen-
cies. The OMB, the Department of Treasury and the SEC submitted
proposals which would have assigned regulatory jurisdiction on the ba-
sis of the underlying commodity on which a futures contract is writ-
ten.292 In response, the CFTC and industry officials described, at great
length, the difference between trading in securities and trading in fu-
tures. These officials noted with particularity the role of securities trad-
ing as a means of raising investment capital, and contrasted the wholly
distinct role of commodities trading as a hedging mechanism. 293 As its
recommendations would show, the Senate committee found this dis-
tinction persuasive and crucial.
Mark- Up
In its report on S. 2391, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nu-
trition and Forestry reviewed the history of the CEA. It concluded that
the purpose of the 1974 amendments-which created the CFTC and
expanded the scope of the CEA-was to accomplish two basic goals:
[T]o provide a uniform regulatory structure covering all futures trad-
ing in both the regulated and previously unregulated commodities
and ... to allow for the extension of the economic benefits of fu-
tures trading under this structure to those areas of commerce where
the risk-shifting and price-discovery functions of futures markets
291. Id at 17-18 (statement of William Bagley).
292. S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2087, 2107-109.
293. See, e.g., 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 289, at 132-37 (statement and testimony of
Leo Melamed); id. at 171-73 (statement of Robert Wilmouth); id. at 228-29 (statement of John
Rainbolt).
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might prove to be of value. 2 9 4
Thus, the committee recognized that futures trading is functionally dif-
ferent from securities trading, whose primary purpose is capital devel-
opment. It averred that, given the unique economic role of futures
transactions, regulatory control over futures trading was not intended
to be shared. Accordingly, the committee affirmed that:
The [CFTC] was created in order to assure that a single expert
agency would have the responsibility for developing a coherent regu-
latory program encompassing futures trading and related activities.
Therefore, Congress has vested in the Commission exclusive jurisdic-
tion to build upon the foundation provided by the Commodity Ex-
change Act in erecting a sound and strong Federal regulatory policy
governing futures trading. 295
The Senate committee was generally laudatory in its evaluation of
the performance of the CFTC. The one substantive concern it ex-
pressed was with the inability of the CFTC to control fraudulent trad-
ing in London options.296 Nevertheless, the committee supported
action which the CFTC had taken--4he promulgation of strict regula-
tions-and cited other factors as responsible for the ineffectiveness of
these regulations.
[These factors included] a year-long legal challenge to the Commis-
sion's regulations before they were ultimately sustained, judicial re-
luctance to close down businesses that were operating without
registration by the Commission, and the Commission's limited re-
sources to enforce the law in the face of pervasive fraudulent prac-
tices. Compounding this problem was the reluctance of the States,
whose regulatory authority had been preempted by the 1974 amend-
ments, to bring parens patriae actions under the Commodity Ex-
change Act or actions under their general antifraud statutes. 297
The Senate report noted that the committee had, during its mark-
up session, considered proposals by the OMB, the SEC and the Depart-
ment of Treasury to remove from the exclusive jurisdiction of the
CFTC certain aspects of futures trading. The committee, however,
pointing out that "[tjhe question of granting exclusive jurisdiction to
the CFTC was extensively debated in 1974, ' '298 rejected these proposals
to modify the grant of exclusive jurisdiction. In doing so, the commit-
tee expressed its support for the continued development of futures con-
294. S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2087, 2098.
295. Id at 13, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2101.
296. Id at 14, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2102.
297. Id
298. Id at 21, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2109.
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tracts, including stock index futures, which would be subject only to
CFTC regulatory jurisdictions. As related by the Senate committee:
In amending the Commodity Exchange Act in 1974, Congress
took the view that limiting commodities subject to the Act to a statu-
tory list when commercial interest in trading futures in many other
commodities was developing would be inappropriate. Accordingly,
Congress determined that the definition of commodity, for purposes
of the Act, would be the commodities on the pre-1974 list plus all
other goods and articles (except onions), as well as all services, rights,
and interests in which futures contracts are or would be traded.
In order to avoid duplication and confusion in the regulation of
futures trading, the Commission created by the 1974 Act was given
exclusive jurisdiction over all accounts, agreements (including op-
tions) and transactions involving futures contracts.
The action Congress took in 1974 reflects the congressional
awareness that futures markets would not remain static. This action
also sought to foster a climate in which the economic benefits of fu-
tures trading could be extended to other areas where such trading
would be of value. Specifically, Congress was aware in 1974 that
proposals for futures trading in financial instruments and Govern-
ment securities were being developed.
The wisdom of these decisions is evident in rapid development
and acceptance of futures markets in both GNMA mortgage-backed
securities and United States Treasury bills.
These are not commodities in the traditional sense. However,
the need and utility of futures markets in these commodities to hedge
against inflation and market uncertainty, as well as aid in market
arbitrage, is evident.
The changing nature of futures markets has stimulated the pro-
posals of the SEC and the Department of the Treasury for increased
jurisdiction by them in specific areas of futures trading. In each case,
their proposals stem from their inherent interest in certain underly-
ing "commodities"-SEC with equity securities and indexes thereof,
and the Treasury with the potential expansion of Government secu-
rity futures contracts.
The committee understands the basis of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission proposal and appreciates the interest of the De-
partment of the Treasury in ensuring the integrity of markets for
Government securities. However, the basic conclusion reached in
1974 that there should be a single regulatory agency responsible for
futures trading is as valid now as it was then.
The committee has followed with interest the changing nature of
futures markets. The nature of the underlying commodity is not an
adequate basis to divide regulatory authority. Further, the fact that a
futures contract market does not fit into the traditional mold where
there are both hedging and price-discovery functions should not be
the determining factor in whether the contract is to be regulated by
the CFTC. So long as the futures contract serves a legitimatefunction,
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Congress has vested the Commodity Futures Trading Commission with
jurisdiction .299
As to the specific possibility that stock index futures might be devel-
oped, the committee simply expressed its intent that "the CFTC will
actively solicit the views of other agencies when any application is
made for a futures contract written on instruments under the jurisdic-
tion" of other agencies. 3°°
The committee also addressed the issue of the appropriate role of
the states in the regulation of commodity trading. It noted that the
proposed addition to the CEA of section 6d would permit the states to
bring actions based on the CEA. Although this version provided the
states more latitude in maintaining suits than had the more cumber-
some device ofparenspatriae actions, it still would not have permitted
the enforcement of local laws. Moreover, to further guard against the
intrusion of local officials into the regulation of commodities trading,
the committee proposed to make the federal courts the exclusive forum
for section 6d actions.30 It believed this was consistent with the
CFTC's "exclusive jurisdiction and preemption of State regulatory ac-
tivity enacted in 1974, and with the present decision to make Federal
law the basis for all actions brought under this section." 30 2 The com-
mittee also expressed its intent that states could still proceed in state
courts if other than injunctive relief were desired. However, it specified
that actions in state courts could proceed only "on the basis of an al-
leged violation of any general civil or criminal antifraud statute. ' 30 3
Finally, the committee noted that the purpose of section 6d's re-
quirement that the states, before instituting actions, must receive the
prior approval of the CFTC is to "assure that the body of decisional
law developed under this section would be coherent and consistent with
national policy. ' ' 3°4 The committee believed that "State prosecutorial
discretion would. . . be checked only to the degree that contemplated
State prosecutions deviate from national policy established by the
Commission." 30 5
299. Id at 21-22, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2109-10 (emphasis added).
300. Id at 23, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2111.
301. Id at 25, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2113.
302. Id
303. Id (emphasis added).
304. Id at 26, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2114.
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Senate Debate
S. 2391 was presented to the Senate on July 12, 1978.306 Debate
was not as extensive as that in the House. The jurisdictional provisions
of S. 2391 were among the first issues discussed. Senator Talmadge,
who had played a major role in the development and passage of the
1974 amendments, expressed his support for continuing to vest exclu-
sive jurisdiction in the CFTC.30 7 He rejected the position of other gov-
ernment agencies that the "agency that is responsible for regulating or
issuing the commodity on which a futures contract is written is the one
who should regulate that futures contract. ' 308 He noted that:
While this approach may have appeal, it overlooks the basic fact that
a futures contract is a futures contract regardless of what the underly-
ing commodity may be. The regulation of futures contracts, likewise,
is not dependent on the underlying commodity on which the futures
contract is written.30 9
Although he acknowledged that the SEC and the Department of
Treasury might "have justifiable concerns over some pending applica-
tions before the CFTC for futures contracts on indexes of equity securi-
ties," 310 Senator Talmadge believed that such concerns could be
resolved as part of the contract market designation process. As he ex-
plained, "we have not been presented any evidence that would indicate
that the CFTC will not conduct full and open deliberations on these
applications that would include the solicitation of advice and counsel
from these two agencies."31
Senator Talmadge believed that until the shortcomings of the ex-
isting system were demonstrated, proposals that could ultimately result
in costly and inefficient overregulation must be rejected.312 Senator
Leahy affirmed Senator Talmadge's dismissal of proposals to allocate
regulatory control over futures contracts on the basis of the underlying
commodity. He asserted that during mark-up of S. 2391, such a propo-
sal "was rejected, and rejected soundly, by all members of the commit-
tee, of all political ideologies, from all parts of the country. '313
The Senate also deliberated the enforcement powers which should
306. 124 CONG. REC. 20,353 (1978).
307. Id at 20,361.
308. Id
309. Id
310. Id
311. Id
312. Id
313. Id
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be available to the states. 314 A motion by Senator Bellman to amend
proposed section 6d was adopted which allowed the states to bring ac-
tions under the CEA without reference to the parenspatriae doctrine
and without first securing prior CFTC approval.3 15 The amendment
identified state securities officials as among those who, if authorized by
state law, could bring actions under section 6d.316 Despite its seeming
liberality, this amendment did not vest any independent regulatory au-
thority in the states; its purpose was simply to encourage state officials
concerned with fraudulent trading activity to bring enforcement ac-
tions, but only in federal court and only under the CEA.3 1 7 Senator
Bellman did not intend his amendment to enable states to pursue mea-
sures deviating from policies enunciated by the CFTC. As he noted, it
"is not meant to subject commodity traders to 50 different sets of laws
as some traders have feared. It simply is meant to provide valuable
assistance to enforcement agencies to prevent or punish fraudulent
practices." 3 18
Conference Committee
In conference, the Senate accepted the House provisions requiring
the CFTC to maintain communication with, and obtain the views of,
other agencies which might be affected by CFTC designation of con-
tract markets for the trading of futures based on financial instru-
ments.319 Even though the House and Senate were aware of concerns
regarding proposed stock index futures, their only response was to in-
sure that other agencies could contribute to, but in no way control, the
CFTC decision as to whether trading in such futures should be ap-
proved. 320 At no time during the House and Senate deliberations was
314. Id at 20,382-88.
315. Id at 20,384-85.
316. Id.
317. According to Senator Bellman, his amendment:
(I) Expands the statutory cause of action to include the right of the States to ob-
tain damages in behalf of their residents or to obtain such further and other relief as the
court may deem appropriate;
(2) Deletes the requirement in S. 2391 of prior Commission approval before the
State may bring an action under this section and substitutes a requirement that the State
must provide the Commission with a copy of its complaint;
(3) Specifically cites the State securities administrator as one of the State officials
who, if otherwise authorized, could bring actions under this section (the ultimate delega-
tion of prosecutorial authority will remain a matter of State law).
Id at 20,385.
318. Id
319. H.R. REP. No. 1628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978).
320. Id Despite the provision in section 2(B)(i) requiring the CFTC to maintain such commu-
nications, it is clear that the CFTC is in no way obligated to defer to concerns expressed by these
other agencies. The Act does not vest veto authority over CFTC decisions in any of these agen-
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it ever suggested that futures contracts on securities indices were inap-
propriate trading instruments. Indeed, virtually all discussion focused
only on the jurisdictional issue, an issue resolved in favor of the CFTC.
As to the question of state jurisdiction, the House and Senate con-
ference also decided in favor of the CFTC, voting to adopt almost in
entirety the Senate version of section 6d.321 However, the version of
section 6d which emerged from conference included the House provi-
sion entitling the CFTC to intervene as a matter of right in any action
brought by a state under section 6d.322 The conferees also modified a
House proposal and included within section 6d a provision clarifying
that "nothing contained in the new section on State jurisdiction shall
prohibit an authorized State official from proceeding in State court on
the basis of an alleged violation of any general civil or criminal an-
tifraud statute of such State. '323 Finally, relative to section 6d, the con-
ferees melded Senate and House provisions exempting designated
contract markets, floor brokers and boards of trade licensed by the
CFTC from state civil actions. The conference adopted both House
and Senate versions with necessary conforming changes. 324
On September 28, 1978, the Senate agreed to the conference report
on S. 2391.325 The House took similar action on September 29, 1978.326
On October 2, 1978, President Carter signed into law the Futures Trad-
ing Act of 1978, extending the life of the CFTC through September 30,
1982.327
V. CONCLUSION
The opponents of stock index futures have advanced arguments
which are inconsistent with both the language and legislative history of
the 1974 and 1978 amendments to the CEA. Congress fostered the de-
velopment of nontraditional futures markets when it enlarged the defi-
nition of commodity to include not only traditional agricultural
cies. Further, under section 2(B)(iii), even if the CFTC ignores its communication responsibilities,
section 2(B)(i) does not "create any rights, liabilities, or obligations upon which [private] actions
may be brought." Id Consequently, the CFTC may continue to designate contract markets just
as it always has. For a contrary view by a former employee of the SEC, see Guttman, The Futures
Trading Act of 1978: The Reafrmation of CFTC-SEC Coordinated Jurisdiction Over Secu-
rity/Commodiies, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1978).
321. H.R. REaP. No. 1628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-24 (1978).
322. Id at 23.
323. Id at 24 (emphasis added).
324. Id at 23.
325. 124 CONG. REc. 32,274 (1978).
326. Id. at 32,707.
327. See PuB. PAPERS OF JIMMY CARTER 1696-97 (Oct. 2, 1978). See also 14 WEEKLY COMP.
OF PRES. Doc. 1696-97 (Oct. 2, 1978).
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products but also "services, rights and interests." As Congress then
explained, the purpose of the expansive definition of commodity was to
bring within the CEA regulatory scheme "all futures trading that might
now exist or might develop in the future. '328
The authority to determine what futures trading "might develop in
the future" was vested exclusively in the CFTC. Although this decision
proved irksome to various state and federal officials, in 1978 Congress
both reaffirmed and clarified its intent to preempt any competing regu-
latory role among the states or other federal agencies. In doing so, it
specifically sanctioned and encouraged the development of stock index
futures and, more significantly, it made explicit what was implicit in
1974--economic utility was to be the primary standard governing
CFTC consideration of proposals for nontraditional futures contracts.
In 1978, Congress rejected proposals to enlarge the regulatory ju-
risdiction of other government units. Congressional sponsors of the
CFTC reauthorization legislation insisted that such authority must
continue to vest exclusively in the CFTC because futures markets re-
quire "an economic expertise which focuses upon the risk-shifting and
price-determining function that futures trading performs. ' 329 They
recognized that futures markets "have not remained static and futures
regulations have covered an increasing number of commodities as the
benefits of futures trading [have] become more widely understood. '330
Critics of these proposed stock index futures have ignored the eco-
nomic purpose standard advanced by Congress. Instead, they have fo-
cused on the adequacy of the instrument's delivery provision as
determinative of its validity as a futures contract. This is ironic. Pend-
ing applications for stock index futures were extensively discussed dur-
ing the 1978 reauthorization proceedings; yet, in its deliberations,
Congress paid scant attention to the delivery controversy. It rejected
criticism of such instruments and encouraged their development, be-
lieving they could "reasonably be expected to serve a valid economic
function."' 33' Additionally, as a corollary of enlarging the definition of
commodity to include tangibles and intangibles, Congress seemed to
invite a much broader conception of delivery.
Even if it were not inconsistent with the congressional approach
toward determining the legitimacy of futures contracts, the emphasis
these critics place on delivery is still surprising. The presumption that
328. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1974).
329. H.R. REP. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978).
330. Id
331. Id at 14.
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delivery provisions, although customarily present, are a congressionally
imposed requirement of a futures contract is increasingly suspect.
Economists have concluded that such provisions are a peculiar Ameri-
can anachronism, which, depending on the commodity, can actually
impede the economic function of the futures contract. Also reinforcing
this skepticism regarding delivery provisions is the fact that less than
three percent of all futures transactions ever result in delivery. Accord-
ingly, in many instances, such provisions are merely perfunctory.
The suggestion that stock index futures would be illegal under
state bucket-shop laws is but another example of the failure of these
critics to grasp the extent and tenor of the 1974 and 1978 amendments
to the CEA. Indeed, even without reference to these amendments, the
bucket-shop statutes, standing alone, are of dubious relevance. Most of
them were enacted prior to the development of regulated exchanges.
They were designed to curb gambling on changes in futures market
prices when, in fact, no futures transaction had been entered into on a
contract market. However, since stock index futures would be traded
on exchanges approved and regulated by the CFTC, they would be
inappropriate subjects for local anti-gambling enforcement efforts. 332
Most states, by ceasing to enforce such laws coincidentally with the
improved federal regulation of exchanges, appear to have recognized
this. Additionally, because many bucket-shop laws require a showing
of lack of intent to deliver the underlying commodity, they would not
apply to stock index futures: as proposed, these futures would provide
for a delivery mechanism.
Although, as suggested earlier, critics who are bound to a nine-
teenth-century conception of delivery might challenge the adequacy of
these delivery provisions, the crucial consideration is whether bucket-
shop statutes may be used as a conduit for expressing this dissatisfac-
tion. Congress has vested solely in the CFTC both authority to deter-
mine whether to designate a contract market for a proposed future, and
exclusive jurisdiction for the regulation of such markets after their
designation. In 1978, state officials testified at the CFTC reauthoriza-
tion proceedings and objected to the begrudgingly acknowledged pre-
emptive scope of section 2(a)(l). Congress responded to these
criticisms by refining, but essentially reaffirming, its 1974 decision to
preclude state regulation of commodities trading.
332. One decision shortly after the enactment of the 1974 amendments held that bucket-shop
laws did not apply to transactions executed on boards of trade even absent intent to make or take
delivery. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Schriver, 541 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1976).
PREEMPTION AND THE CFA
Throughout these proceedings, members of Congress emphasized
the importance of maintaining uniform regulation of commodities mar-
kets under a single agency with an expertise in the economic underpin-
nings of futures trading. Specific proposals to carve out exceptions to
the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction were rejected by Congress. As they
finally emerged, the 1978 amendments to the CEA embodied this con-
gressional intent that the federal law provide the basis for all regulation
of commodities trading. Accordingly, states are permitted to bring ac-
tions in federal court to enforce only the CEA and the regulations
promulgated by the CFTC. Clearly, trading in futures contracts au-
thorized by the CFTC would not provide the basis for such an enforce-
ment action.
The only other alternative permitted the states under the CEA are
enforcement actions in state courts for violation of general civil or
criminal antifraud statutes. As was noted previously, however, bucket-
shop laws are not general antifraud statutes. They were enacted spe-
cifically in response to gambling associated with commodities trading.
Even state officials participating in the 1978 proceedings characterized
these laws as "regulatory" and "commodities-related." Accordingly,
section 6d of the CEA cannot be construed so as to authorize a state to
prohibit under its bucket-shop laws trading in CFTC-approved stock
index futures.
At least one federal district court already has found that the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the CEA preempts state bucket-shop laws and other
anti-gambling legislation. 333 As trading in futures based on financial
instruments expands, other courts may be called upon not only to adju-
dicate the validity of nontraditional futures contracts approved by the
CFTC, but also to explore in greater detail the preemptive scope of the
CFTC's exlcusive jurisdiction. In such analysis, it is important for the
courts to savor the distinct flavor of the legislative history of the 1974
and 1978 amendments to the CEA. Commodities trading is an ancient
practice and its value to the national economy has been affirmed by
Congress. In the CEA amendments of the past decade, Congress has
attempted to wrest from commodities trading concepts which are ves-
tiges of nineteenth-century practices. Accordingly, it has urged both an
administrative and legal approach to futures markets which is
333. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Conaway, [1981] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,200. Commendably, the court emphasized the national nature of commodity exchanges and
characterized them as "an extremely vital component in our economic system." Id at 24,956.
The court concluded that enforcement of the Alabama bucket-shop law would destroy commodity
trading in that state. Id
722 CHICAGO KENT L4 W REVIEW
grounded in an appreciation of the vital risk-shifting and price-discov-
ery functions that such markets perform. Without such an apprecia-
tion, the expressed congressional desire to see the economic benefits of
futures trading extended to nontraditional markets will be frustrated.
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